Campus Violence Prevention and Response:

Best Practices for Massachusetts Higher Education

Report to Massachusetts Department of Higher Education

June 2008

Principal Contributors

Daniel O'Neill

President and CEO, Applied Risk Management

James Alan Fox, Ph.D.

The Lipman Family Professor of Criminal Justice and Professor of Law, Policy and Society, Northeastern University

Roger Depue, Ph.D.

Forensic Behavioral Scientist – Founder, The Academy Group, Inc.

Elizabeth Englander, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology and Director of Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center, Bridgewater State College

Executive Summary

Pervasive media images of mass shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University have raised the specter of serious violence on college campuses. But by any measure, the risk of serious violence on campus is remarkably low, particularly in its most extreme form. Although the chances of serious violence may be remote, the potential consequences can be devastating and long-lasting. Colleges must respond proactively to the risk, as parents rightly expect a special level of care for their sons and daughters while they are away at school. Thus, it is prudent and imperative that colleges take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of students as well as faculty and other employees.

While shootings may be the most visible form of campus violence, they are clearly not the most commonplace. Security practices must also focus on other, more prevalent, forms of violence such as sexual and physical assault. Current best practices, taken in combination with research, demonstrate the essential role of collaboration among all service providers in the prevention of violent incidents on college campuses.

This report has four major sections. First, we define the nature and scope of campus violence both nationally and in Massachusetts. Next, we review previous reports of study groups and task forces and discuss established best practices for enhancing campus safety and violence prevention. Third, we examine the current state of security and violence prevention at institutions of higher education throughout Massachusetts based upon a survey conducted of public colleges and universities. Finally, by comparing these results with established best practices, we advance 27 recommendations for how Massachusetts schools can best improve their security and violence prevention efforts. Below are the key findings from each of the four sections.

Section One: Definition of the National/Massachusetts Landscape

1. Violent crime, particularly homicide, is extremely rare both nationally and in Massachusetts.
2. Of the 13 fatal mass shootings that have occurred at American college campuses since 1990, eight were perpetrated by current or former students from graduate or professional schools. Therefore, graduate student disgruntlement should be a particular focus for higher education officials.
3. Violent crime at Massachusetts public colleges and universities typically takes place within dormitories, occurs late at night, is argument-related, entails little or no injury to the victim, and involves a victim and offender who know each other.

Section Two: Previously Established Best Practices for Campus Safety and Violence Prevention

1. A set of "best practices" recommendations were found to be common among 20 previous reports on campus violence produced by work groups and task forces from around the country. These were:
   a. Create an all-hazards Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
   b. Adopt an emergency mass notification and communications system
   c. Establish a multi-disciplinary team to respond to threats and other dangerous behaviors
   d. Review and train personnel regarding privacy/information sharing laws and policies such as FERPA and HIPAA
   e. Have an MOU with local health agencies and other key partners in the community
   f. Practice emergency plans and conduct training
   g. Educate and train students, faculty, and staff about mass notification systems and their roles and responsibilities in an emergency
   h. Educate faculty, staff, and students about recognizing and responding to signs of mental illness and potential threats
   i. Conduct risk and safety assessments
   j. Have an interoperable communication system with all area responders
   k. Ensure that all responder agencies are trained in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS)
2. Site visits to five Massachusetts public colleges and universities highlighted that particular campuses had:
   a. Received free on-site training by the FBI for interpreting violent writings
   b. Installed CCTV cameras and an extensive electronic access control system
   c. Received free on-site Active Shooter Response Training conducted by the Massachusetts State Police
   d. Implemented comprehensive mass notification systems, including e-mail, text messaging, voice messaging, and web-based alerts, with one school having 100% enrollment
   e. Issued advanced equipment to campus police officers, including weapons, vehicles, and communication systems
   f. Conducted weekly Threat Assessment Team meetings that included members from campus police, residential life, counseling services, faculty, and the graduate and undergraduate school deans

Section Three: Existing Campus Safety and Violence Prevention Practices in Massachusetts

1. Eighty-three percent of the schools provide on-campus mental health services for students, and of these schools, 57 percent provide specialized services (e.g., substance abuse, suicide prevention, eating disorders) rather than just generalized services

2. Eighty-one percent of the schools do not submit potentially violent writings, drawings and other forms of individual expression to a forensic behavioral science expert for review
3. Over half of the schools (58%) have exterior doors that are in need of repair or replacement
4. Fifty-four percent of schools do not employ CCTV cameras on campus
5. Fifty-two percent of schools train their campus police officers in active shooter response tactics
6. Sixty-four percent of schools have never conducted active shooter drills
7. Eighty-four percent of schools have campus police officers who carry "less-than-lethal" weapons, and only one-third have police officers who carry firearms
8. All schools report having mass notification technology
9. Forty-one percent of schools report that their communications equipment is not interoperable with local law enforcement agencies, and two-thirds report that their communications equipment is not interoperable with Federal law enforcement or emergency management agencies
10. One-third of the schools do not have a formal policy in place regarding what faculty and staff should do if they have concerns about a student or colleague who appears to have the potential for becoming violent
11. Seventy percent of schools do not specifically train faculty and staff on how to recognize risk factors for students and employees who may pose a risk of violence
12. Eighty-eight percent of schools have not conducted a vulnerability assessment of their campus
13. One-third of schools do not have a mutual aid agreement with neighboring law enforcement agencies, and 48 percent do not have mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities for emergency medical training or support
14. All schools report having an Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
15. Sixty-five percent of the schools have a Threat Assessment Team (TAT)
16. Sixty-five percent of the schools report that they do not have a trained behavioral health Trauma Response Team

Section Four: Recommendations for Campus Safety and Violence Prevention

1. Early Detection and Prevention

   Recommendation #1: Campus mental health services should be clearly available and easily accessible to students.

   Recommendation #2: Schools should offer specialized mental health services, not just generalized services.

   Recommendation #3: Writings, drawings, and other forms of individual expression reflecting violent fantasy and causing a faculty member to be

fearful or concerned about safety, should be evaluated contextually for any potential threat.

2. Physical and Electronic Security

   Recommendation #4: Schools should ensure that all exterior doors are properly constructed and lockable.

   Recommendation #5: Schools should develop a reasonable plan for electronic access control in the event of an emergency.

   Recommendation #6: Schools should install CCTV cameras throughout their campuses.

   Recommendation #7: Schools should equip all classrooms with emergency signaling/notification capabilities.

3. Campus Police Department

   Recommendation #8: Campus police departments should have up-to-date active shooter response plans in place and train their officers in active shooter response tactics.

   Recommendation #9: Campus safety staffing levels should be adequate for the size and character of the school.

   Recommendation #10: Sworn campus police officers should be armed and trained in the use of personal or specialized firearms.

   Recommendation #11: Schools should ensure that the campus police department has the equipment necessary to gain forcible entry into locked buildings and classrooms.

4. Mass Notification

   Recommendation #12: Schools should have a communications system that is interoperable with outside agencies.

   Recommendation #13: Schools should establish a formal policy for use of their mass notification system.

5. Policies and Procedures

   Recommendation #14: Schools should have in place a formal policy outlining how and to whom faculty and staff should refer students who appear to have the potential for becoming violent.

Recommendation #15: Faculty and staff should receive training in identifying students at risk.

Recommendation #16: Faculty and staff should receive training in managing difficult interactions and situations.

Recommendation #17: Faculty and staff should be informed about the appropriate protocol in the event of a crisis.

Recommendation #18: Schools should include public safety as part of the orientation process.

Recommendation #19: Graduate student applicants should be directly queried regarding any unusual academic histories, as well as criminal records and disciplinary actions.

Recommendation #20: Schools should conduct vulnerability assessments at least once per year.

Recommendation #21: Schools should form mutual aid agreements or have Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's) with agencies in the community having necessary support resources, such as mental health service providers, emergency medical response services, and law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation #22: Schools should have multiple reporting systems that permit campus community members to report suspicious behavior anonymously and conveniently.

6. Emergency Response

Recommendation #23: Every college and university should review and update its Emergency Response Plan (ERP) on a regular basis.

Recommendation #24: Every school should form, train and maintain a Threat Assessment Team (TAT).

Recommendation #25: The TAT should consist of representatives from various departments and agencies, minimally comprised of student services and counseling staff, faculty, police, human resources personnel, and legal counsel.

Recommendation #26: Each school should have a trained behavioral health Trauma Response Team (TRT), either on campus or through a contract or formal agreement.

Recommendation #27: Schools should plan for victim services and aftermath issues.

This review of best practices and current research underlines the need for careful and measured planning for campus safety. Campus safety is not simple or universal; it requires an analysis of each school's unique situation, character, setting, population, and mission. The recommendations in this report should not be addressed in isolation; rather, they should be considered in the broader context of the campus's approach to prevention and security and should take into account the views and perspectives of a wide array of stakeholders in consultation with professionals and experts. Such collaborative efforts may ultimately offer the soundest security and safety plan for any institution of higher education.

Campus Safety and Violence Prevention Work Group

The Campus Safety and Violence Prevention Work Group, identified below, represents a joint effort by the Department of Higher Education, the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, the Executive Office of Health and Human Services, and the Office of the Attorney General, to analyze the causes of campus-based violence and make recommendations regarding campus safety and violence prevention.

Name	Institution/Organization
Mary Ellen Ashley	Northern Essex Community College
Lester Blumberg	MA Department of Mental Health, General Counsel
Tammy Bringaze	Westfield State College
Kevin Burke	Secretary, Executive Office of Public Safety & Security
Frederick Clark	Department of Higher Education
Layla D'Emilia-Shepherd	Legislative Section, EOPS
Mary Jane England	Regis College
Linda Jones	Salem State College
Jim Juliano	Bunker Hill Community College
Barbara Leadholm	MA Department of Mental Health, Commissioner
Ryan McCarthy	MA Art, Campus Police
Clantha McCurdy	Department of Higher Education
Barbara O'Connor	UMass Amherst Police
Eileen O'Connor	Department of Higher Education
Carlene Pavlos	MA Department of Public Health, Director, Violence & Injury Prevention
Patricia Plummer	Department of Higher Education
Shane Rodriguez	Salem State College, Campus Police
Mary Sullivan	Community Information & Education Division, AGO
Joseph Sullivan	Department of Higher Education
Peter Tsaffaras	Department of Higher Education
Leonard Von Flatern	MA State Police

Campus Safety and Violence Prevention Work Group
Campus Liaisons

The individuals listed below were points of contact for collecting various data and reports from the Massachusetts public colleges and universities.

Institution	Name(s) of Contact
Berkshire Community College	Paul Swearengin
Bristol Community College	Steve Kenyon
Bunker Hill Community College	James Juliano
Cape Cod Community College	Phillip Ryan
Greenfield Community College	Bill Mayrose
Holyoke Community College	Ralph Gould
Mass Bay Community College	Kim Gazzola
Massasoit Community College	Carl Kowalski
Middlesex Community College	Patrick Cook
Mount Wachusett Community College	Edward Terceiro
North Shore Community College	Douglas Puska
Northern Essex Community College	Mary Ellen Ashley
Quinsigamond Community College	Kevin Ritacco
Roxbury Community College	Thomas Galvin
Springfield Tech	David Siano
Bridgewater State College	David Tillinghast
Fitchburg State College	James Hamel
Framingham State College	Brad Medeiros
Mass College of Art	Dwayne Farley
Mass College of Liberal Arts	Joseph Charon
MA Maritime Academy	Allen Hansen
Salem State College	William Anglin
Westfield State College	Tony Casciano
Worcester State College	Rosemary Naughton
UMass Amherst	Jo-Anne Vanin & Barbara O'Connor
UMass Boston	Philip O'Donnell
UMass Dartmouth	Emile Fioravanti
UMass Lowell	Annie Ciaraldi
UMass Worcester	John Luippold

Authors of the Report

- Roger L. Depue, Ph.D. – Forensic Behavioral Scientist – Founder of the Academy Group, Inc. (AGI), Former Head of the FBI Behavioral Science Unit and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. Dr. Depue has provided briefings to top U.S. Government officials, including White House staff; testified before both houses of the U.S. Congress; attended and lectured at White House conferences; and made presentations to top-level corporate and government agency executives. In April of 2007, Virginia Governor Tim Kaine appointed Dr. Depue to an eight-member review commission to examine the Virginia Tech mass shootings. Among his contributions to the final report, Dr. Depue authored Appendix M, "Red Flags, Warning Signs and Indicators" and Appendix N, "A Theoretical Profile of Seung Hui Cho: From the Perspective of a Forensic Behavioral Scientist." Dr. Depue is an internationally known author and speaker on leadership and forensic behavioral science topics as well as author of his recently published book, *Between Good and Evil*.

- Elizabeth Kandel Englander, Ph.D. - Professor of Psychology and the Founder and Director of the Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center, Bridgewater State College – The Center delivers anti-violence and anti-bullying programs, resources, and research for the state of Massachusetts. She is a nationally recognized expert in the area of bullying and cyberbullying, childhood causes of violence and aggression, child development, and characteristics of juvenile and adult violent offenders. Dr. Englander is the first recipient of the Presidential Fellowship at Bridgewater State College, and her expertise in children's violence led to her appointment to the Advisory Boards for several organizations and to the Executive Committee for the mental health component of the Attorney General's Safe Schools Initiative under former Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly. She has collaborated with the Massachusetts State Senate in developing legislation and has testified as an expert before the Senate. Dr. Englander is the author of more than thirty articles in journals and books, and is the author of *Understanding Violence*, a text in the field of child development, biological psychology, and violent criminal behavior, now out in its third edition. She has been cited on hundreds of occasions in the print media and has appeared on both local and national television and radio across the country and in Canada.

- James Alan Fox, Ph.D. – Criminologist – The Lipman Family Professor of Criminal Justice and Professor of Law, Policy and Society at Northeastern University in Boston. Dr. Fox has published sixteen books, including his two newest, *The Will to Kill: Making Sense of Senseless Murder,* and *Extreme Killing: Understanding Serial and Mass Murder.* He has also published hundreds of journal and magazine articles and newspaper columns, primarily in the areas of multiple murder, juvenile crime, school violence, workplace violence, and capital punishment. Among his many and varied consulting roles, Dr. Fox served

on President Clinton's advisory group on school shootings and on an expert panel for the U.S. Department of Education on "Safe, Disciplined, and Drug-Free Schools." Dr. Fox has written on the topic of campus violence and security for several publications, including the *Chronicle of Higher Education* and *The New York Times*. Finally, he recently completed a study of campus homicides nationwide.

- Daniel O'Neill – Founder, President and CEO of Applied Risk Management (ARM), LLC- ARM provides global risk management and security engineering services. Mr. O'Neill has been the Principal in Charge of over 100 security consulting engagements including multiple large scale university and college projects. Mr. O'Neill is a former US Army Airborne Ranger and is a graduate of the Harvard Business School.

- David B. Baty – COO, President of International Operations of Applied Risk Management (ARM), LLC- Emergency Management Specialist. Mr. Baty was responsible for the evaluation of Physical Protection Systems within the US Air Forces Pacific Command. He developed Full Spectrum Response plans for Emergency Plans for US Air Force and clients within the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) States. He also prepared vulnerability assessments of 29 public buildings within the District of Columbia.

- Roger Rueda, PSP- Senior Technical Consultant, ARM – Mr. Rueda has experience in the private sector physical/electronic security and building automation systems management, including design, installation, programming, and maintenance. He also has extensive experience in development and implementation of disaster management and recovery procedures in the healthcare, higher education, and bio-technology sectors.

- Jenna Savage – Doctoral Candidate – M.S. in Criminal Justice; Ph.D. in Criminology and Justice Policy in progress, Northeastern University. Ms. Savage's dissertation research explores how gender differences in socialization can lead to subsequent differences in criminal and deviant behavior.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary i

Campus Safety and Violence Prevention Work Group vii

Campus Safety and Violence Prevention Work Group Campus Liaisons viii

Authors of the Report ix

INTRODUCTION **1**

SECTION ONE: DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL/MASSACHUSETTS LANDSCAPE **5**

SECTION TWO: PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BEST PRACTICES FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION **12**

SECTION THREE: EXISTING CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION PRACTICES IN MASSACHUSETTS **22**

SECTION FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION **30**

CONCLUSION **47**

APPENDIX A: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MASSACHUSETTS COLLEGES **49**

APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM EXISTING REPORTS ON CAMPUS VIOLENCE **53**

APPENDIX C: RECOMMENDED ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION TOPICS **58**

APPENDIX D: SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESULTS **61**

APPENDIX E: SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES FROM RESEARCH TEAM **91**

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The April 2007 massacre of 32 victims on the otherwise bucolic campus of Virginia Tech University sent shockwaves through college and university communities across America. Not only was it the most devastating violent episode ever to occur at an institution of higher learning, it was the largest mass shooting of any kind in our nation's history.

The sense of serenity and security that characterized most campuses was suddenly shaken. And when another seemingly random shooting claimed the lives of five students in February 2008 at Northern Illinois University, college administrators everywhere had to confront a new reality in which the risk of campus rampage was not to be taken lightly.

Although the risk of a random shooting on any particular college campus remains especially small, the possibility of copycat behavior on the part of a isolated few who may find inspiration in the recent acts of campus shooters warrants special attention to prevention and emergency response, at least in the short term for as long as the contagion of campus violence is a concern.

In addition, although the risk for mass shootings and other incidents of extreme violence on college and university campuses is remote, it remains very real and the consequences are devastating to victims, families, and to the entire campus community. Given the special level of care that parents expect of colleges with regard to their sons and daughters, it is hardly wise or reasonable for college officials ever to ignore the risk, however limited. American colleges are under pressure from worried parents, as well as from the news media, to enhance campus safety by diverting scarce resources away from academic needs to security. Schools have the responsibility to do all they can to prevent and prepare for such attacks.

Predictably, the media tends to focus on the most extreme incidents of violence, such as mass shootings and terrorist threats. However, it is, in fact, far more common for college students, faculty, and staff to become victims of aggravated assault, rape, and robbery. Therefore, in addition to preventing and preparing for the most extreme forms of campus violence, colleges and universities must also take precautionary steps to prevent these more common forms of violence from occurring.

Media reports also overfocus on certain contributing factors to violence, such as mental illness, thereby reinforcing stereotypes. It is true that at times, violence is associated with mental illness, and the number of college students with severe mental illness has been steadily increasing over the years. Thus, not only must schools ensure that their campuses are physically safe and procedurally sound, but they must take steps to provide for the mental and emotional well-being of their student body. The vast majority of mentally ill students will never become violent, much less perpetrate a mass shooting. In fact, college students are 100 times more likely to

commit suicide than homicide. Whatever the behavioral expression, it is critical that schools take every step they can to respond to the mental health needs of their students.

Reports that have concentrated primarily on the shooter's mental health (or lack thereof) may have failed to take into account other factors which are equally important, such as campus climate and social support. For the purpose of averting severe violence on college campuses, it is unwise to direct prevention efforts exclusively in the area of mental health services, as such a tactic would lead to neglect of other very important areas which need attention.

By providing an environment that ensures both the physical safety and mental well-being of its community, colleges and universities can improve the overall quality of life on campus. The purpose of this report is to help the public colleges and universities of Massachusetts reach this goal. Our task was to examine the nature and scope of campus violence, including homicide, sexual offenses, and aggravated assault.

This report has four major sections. First, we define the nature and scope of campus violence both nationally and in Massachusetts. Next, we review previous studies and discuss established best practices for enhancing campus safety and violence prevention. Third, we examine the current state of security and violence prevention at institutions of higher education throughout Massachusetts based upon a survey conducted of public colleges and universities. Finally, by comparing these results with established best practices, we put forth our recommendations for how Massachusetts schools can best improve their security and violence prevention efforts.

Several activities went into producing the work represented in this report. These include:

1. Meetings with the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education Campus Safety and Violence Prevention Work Group
2. Collection and analysis of violent crime data from Massachusetts public colleges and universities for the years 2000 to 2007
3. Assembly and analysis of a national database of college campus homicides for the years 2000 to 2005
4. Analysis of campus safety data for 135 colleges and universities nationwide obtained from a recent survey sponsored by *Reader's Digest* and published in February 2008
5. Analysis of national campus law enforcement survey data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the 1994-1995 and 2004-2005 academic years
6. A comprehensive review and analysis of 20 previously written reports on campus safety at colleges and universities around the country

7. Development, implementation, and analysis of results from an on-line survey of existing campus safety conditions at Massachusetts public colleges and universities
8. Site visits to five public college and university campuses in Massachusetts to review their existing violence prevention practices

We would like to acknowledge various individuals and organizations for their assistance and cooperation: the Massachusetts State Legislature and Governor Deval Patrick for authorizing this important project; Patricia Plummer, Ph.D., Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Education; Peter Tsaffaras, Director of Employee Relations for the Massachusetts Department of Higher Education; Marsha Medalie and Larry Berkowitz from Riverside Trauma Center; *Reader's Digest* magazine; and the various individuals at public colleges and universities throughout Massachusetts who participated in filling out the crime incidence and campus violence prevention surveys and those who hosted the campus site visits. In addition, we note with appreciation the cooperation of Kevin Burke, Secretary of Public Safety and Dr. JudyAnn Bigby, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Finally, we would like to thank Tryntje Gill of the Board of Higher Education for her exemplary efforts throughout the course of this project.

SECTION ONE

DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL/MASSACHUSETTS LANDSCAPE

DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL/MASSACHUSETTS LANDSCAPE

Overview: In this section, we present statistics on the incidence of violent crime on college campuses both nationally and here in Massachusetts. From these figures, we see that, overall, college campuses are quite safe. However, the threat of violence is very real, and it is imperative that colleges and universities expand their resources in an effort to prevent and prepare for such violence if it occurs.

*****

National landscape

The recent tragedies at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University have made us all too aware of the potential for violence on our college campuses, and of heightened potential for contagion. However, it is important to maintain perspective on the actual level of risk. Based upon information from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting program and the U.S. Department of Education's records mandated by the Clery Act, as well as information provided by news coverage, there were 76 homicides reported on college campuses nationwide between 2001 and 2005. Leaving aside cases involving faculty, staff or other non-students as victims, the count of undergraduates and graduate students murdered at school numbered 51, an average of about 10 per year. And of these homicides, as shown in Table 1, the majority involved acquaintance killings or drug deals gone bad, not rampaging shooters.

Of course, issues of violence and violence prevention extend well beyond the few widely-publicized crimes that form the tip of a larger iceberg. But even in the broader context of campus violence, the incidence of violence at college is rather low, as shown in Table 2, and the risk of serious victimization is typically far lower than the areas adjacent to most campuses. College law enforcement agencies reported an average of only 7 serious violent crimes per school in 2004 — 2 robberies, 2 forcible rapes, and 3 aggravated assaults. However, certain violent crimes — particularly rape — tend to be underreported. Therefore, we can assume that these statistics for violent crime on college campuses are an underestimate of reality.

Table 1: Patterns of Campus Homicides in the United States, 2001-2005

Number of homicides	76
Characteristic	**Percent**
Weapon	
Gun	52.2%
Knife	11.6%
Personal	21.7%
Other	14.5%
Sex of Victim	
Male	61.3%
Female	38.7%
Victim Role	
Student	57.3%
Faculty	9.3%
Staff	9.3%
Child	5.3%
Other	18.7%
Sex of Offender	
Male	90.8%
Female	9.2%
Offender Role	
Student	35.5%
Former student	5.3%
Outsider	32.2%
Undetermined	27.0%
Victim/Offender Relationship	
Partner	12.5%
Friend	28.3%
Acquaintance	6.6%
Stranger	27.6%
Undetermined	25.0%

Source: Homicide reports drawn from the U.S. Dept. of Education, FBI Uniform Crime Reports and newspaper archives

Table 2: Average Number of Serious Violent Crimes Reported by Campus law Enforcement Agencies in the United States, 2004

Type and size of campus	Homicide	Forcible Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total
All campuses	< 0.5	2	2	3	7
Public Schools	< 0.5	2	2	3	7
15,000 or more	< 0.5	3	4	6	12
10,000-14,999	< 0.5	2	1	2	5
5,000-9,999	0	1	1	2	4
2,500-4,999	0	1	1	1	3
Private Schools	< 0.5	2	2	2	7
15,000 or more	< 0.5	7	11	7	25
10,000-14,999	0	4	5	4	12
5,000-9,999	< 0.5	2	2	3	7
2,500-4,999	< 0.5	1	1	1	3

Sources: U.S. Dept. of Education, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and FBI Uniform Crime Reports.

Perhaps the most striking fact pattern among campus shootings is the disproportionate involvement of graduate students as perpetrators. Of the 13 fatal mass shootings in the United States since 1990, shown in Table 3, eight were committed by current or former graduate, law, or medical students, compared to three by undergraduates and two by outsiders. Thus, graduate students should be a particular concern for public universities and to a lesser extent for state colleges. Unlike undergraduates, graduate students, including law students and medical students, often lack balance in their personal lives (that is, academic work to the exclusion of other interests). No longer supported financially by parents, they experience great pressure to juggle assistantship activities or outside employment with coursework and thesis research, let alone attending to social networks. At some point, their entire lifestyle and sense of worth may revolve around academic achievement. Moreover, their personal investment in reaching a successful outcome can be viewed as a virtual life-or-death matter. This perception can be intensified for foreign graduate students from certain cultures where failure is seen as shame on the entire family. Foreign students also experience additional pressures because the academic visas allowing them to remain in this country are often dependent upon their continued student status.

For all of these reasons, it is important that graduate admissions committees look beyond grades and test scores to discern evidence of possible academic or disciplinary problems in the backgrounds of recruits. A record of attendance at multiple institutions without completing a degree, for example, may warrant inquiry into the reasons for such transiency. In addition, faculty advisors and academic standing committees should be wary of retaining a marginal student when the prospects for degree completion begin to appear remote.

Compounding the problem is the fact that faculty mentors, the gatekeepers to success, may be unaware of the pressures placed upon their students. At the extreme, some faculty members may even maintain an oppressive relationship with graduate students, perhaps perpetuating a power imbalance they themselves suffered in graduate school. Regrettably, not all faculty members are sensitive to the enormous and often unrestrained power they have over students.

Table 3: Shootings Involving Multiple Fatalities on College Campuses in the United States, 1990 to Present

Date	School	Shooter, Age	Role at School
November 1, 1991	University of Iowa	Gang Lu, 28	Graduate student
December 14, 1992	Simon's Rock College	Wayne Lo, 18	Undergraduate student
January 26, 1995	University of North Carolina	Wendell Williamson, 26	Former law student
August 15, 1996	San Diego State University	Frederick Davidson, 36	Graduate student
June 28, 2000	University of Washington	Jan Chen, 42	Medical student
August 28, 2000	University of Arkansas	James Easton Kelly, 36	Former graduate student
May 17, 2001	Pacific Lutheran University	Donald Cowan, 55	None
January 16, 2002	Appalachian School of Law	Peter Odighizuwa, 42	Former law student
October 28, 2002	University of Arizona	Robert Flores, 40	Graduate student
September 2, 2006	Shepherd University	Douglas Pennington, 49	Parent of students
April 16, 2007	Virginia Tech	Seung-Hui Cho, 23	Undergraduate student
February 8, 2008	Louisiana Tech	Latina Williams, 23	Undergraduate student
February 14, 2008	Northern Illinois University	Steven Kazmierczak, 27	Former graduate student

Massachusetts landscape

In order to gauge the extent of violence that takes place at Massachusetts institutions of higher education, we requested crime data for the years 2000 through 2007 from all public colleges and universities. We received data, in varying formats and levels of detail, from nearly half the schools, including the flagship campus in Amherst. The following results are based on these crime data, and are not necessarily representative of all public colleges and universities in Massachusetts.

As shown in Table 4, the schools reported a total of 384 violent offenses from 2000 to 2007, including 1 homicide, 73 forcible rapes, 55 robberies, and 255 aggravated assaults, with no particular upward or downward trend during this time period.

Table 4: Violent Offenses Reported at Selected
Public Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts, 2000-2007

		Homicide		Forcible Rape		Robbery		Aggravated Assault		Total	
		Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Year	2000	0	0%	9	20%	4	9%	32	71%	45	100%
	2001	0	0%	12	21%	10	18%	34	61%	56	100%
	2002	1	2%	15	35%	10	23%	17	40%	43	100%
	2003	0	0%	9	18%	7	14%	35	69%	51	100%
	2004	0	0%	9	18%	5	10%	36	72%	50	100%
	2005	0	0%	6	11%	9	17%	39	72%	54	100%
	2006	0	0%	4	10%	4	10%	31	79%	39	100%
	2007	0	0%	9	19%	6	13%	31	68%	46	100%
	2000-2007	1	0%	73	19%	55	14%	255	66%	384	100%

In addition to these crime counts, we obtained detailed offense information for nearly all of the violent episodes. We found that over half the episodes occurred inside a dormitory, and over one-third outdoors. Very few occurred in classrooms or offices on campus. Since most incidents tended to fall toward the less severe end of the violent crime spectrum, most of the victims were not injured physically, and a majority of the remaining victims received only minor injury. In part, this resulted from the fact that a gun or knife was used in about one of every five of the cases.

While robberies were often committed by strangers, at least three quarters of the rapes and assaults involved friends or roommates as perpetrators. Most of the incidents — specifically the assaults — were precipitated by arguments. Furthermore, nearly a quarter of the offenses occurred between midnight and 2 a.m., and over half occurred between 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Time of Day Distribution for Violent Offenses at Massachusetts Public Colleges and Universities

Over 60 percent of the victims and about 90 percent of the perpetrators were male. In terms of race, about three-quarters of both victims and offenders were Caucasian, although these distributions are particularly dependent of the demographic composition of the reporting schools' student populations. Finally, age of victim and offender both tended to match the typical age-range of college students, with an average of just over 21 years-old, although both distributions contained a fair number of older individuals, reflecting non-students as victims or perpetrators.

Overall, the type, prevalence, and severity of violence reflected in these data do not rise to the level that occurred in recent high-profile shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University. Moreover, the tendency is toward argument-related assaults between individuals who know each other with relatively limited or no physical injury resulting from the altercation.

Conclusion about incidence and pattern of violence

Overall, college and university campuses — both nationally and in Massachusetts — are quite safe. We must not, however, become complacent and ignore the potential for violence, especially shootings. When such incidents of extreme violence occur, they receive intense and long-lasting media focus. This attention produces a contagion effect — when others identify with the perpetrators, rather than with the victims and their families, increasing the likelihood of copycat violence.

Even though Massachusetts public colleges and universities have not witnessed the kind of horrific episode for which many of the recommendations contained in this report are designed, the potential does exist. It is critical that colleges and universities maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of available resources. They must do everything in their power to prevent and prepare for such extreme forms of violence, as well as the more common forms of violence that students, faculty, and staff face on a more regular basis. For this reason, the recommendations in this report are intended to help decrease all types of violence on campus, not just the most extreme and highly visible forms. While there can never be an iron-clad guarantee against the occurrence of an episode of serious violence, these steps should at least enhance the safety and well-being of the entire campus community.

SECTION TWO

PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BEST PRACTICES FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BEST PRACTICES FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

Overview: In this section, we review and discuss the most frequently cited "best practices" recommended by various task forces and study groups on how to enhance campus safety and violence prevention. We also present best practices observed at public colleges and universities throughout Massachusetts that participated in this study.

*****

National best practices

In order to gather information about established best practices in campus safety and violence prevention, we consulted 20 reports from various task forces and study groups around the country. For a list of these reports and their recommendations, see the table in Appendix B. Given the specific details provided by many of these reports, it was not possible to consider every single recommendation that was made. We did, however, highlight those recommendations that were the most common. In this section, we specifically highlight those recommendations advanced by at least half of these reports in order of their frequency, beginning with those recommendations that are recommended most frequently. For each, the percentage of the reports including the recommendation is noted in parentheses.

1. Create an all-hazards Emergency Response Plan. (95%)

    The most commonly recommended best practice recommended is the creation of an all-hazards Emergency Response Plan (ERP). It is no surprise, therefore, that a *Reader's Digest* survey of 135 colleges and universities throughout the country found that over 90 percent of schools have ERP's in place (see Figure 2).[1] The ERP should have the names, positions, and contact information of persons to be notified in the event of a large-scale emergency. The ERP should be reviewed at least every two years in order to keep it current and updated as necessary. The plan should describe persons and entities to be contacted, and the actions to be taken in response to various emergencies.

[1] *Reader's Digest College Safety Survey*, February 2008.



Figure 2: National Practices in Emergency Preparedness

2. Adopt an emergency mass notification and communications system. (95%)

   It is vital that a school be able to communicate quickly and effectively with its entire community in the event of an emergency in order to notify them about the situation and to relay critical information regarding the event. Nearly all of the reports recommended that every campus have an emergency communications alerting system to provide information on the nature of an emergency and action to be taken. The initial messages should be provided in a timely manner and they should be updated as more information becomes known. There should also be multiple means of delivering information so that if one should fail, others may get through.

   Judging from the *Reader's Digest* survey results (see Figure 2), the vast majority of schools around the country have invested in mass notification systems. These devices range from low-tech alarms and sirens that signal an emergency of some unspecified kind to high-tech electronic text alerts and digital message boards.

3. Establish a multidisciplinary team to respond to threats and other dangerous behaviors (e.g., Threat Assessment Team). (80%)

   Many of the reports recommend that schools establish a multidisciplinary team, most commonly referred to as the Threat Assessment Team (TAT). This team should be a standing group for the purpose of receiving and assessing all reports of threats and other alarming behaviors by any student or employee of the college or university. The TAT should plan a course of action for dealing with a problem and forward its recommendations to the president or other senior administrator of the institution. The TAT should consist of persons

representing the school administration, law enforcement, mental health, faculty, student services, legal counsel, and human resources functions.

4. Review and train personnel regarding privacy/info sharing laws and policies such as FERPA and HIPAA. (80%)

   The issue of student privacy is a frequent cause of concern for colleges and universities across the nation. There is much confusion about what information can be shared between schools, and between entities within the same school. This confusion must be addressed and clarified in the educational environment in order that information necessary to assess properly the risks and to safeguard campuses may be obtained. Many of the published reports recommended that private information holders should be trained regarding the limits of legal privacy and be familiar with the circumstances under which information can be shared.

5. Have a MOU with local health agencies and other key partners in the community. (75%)

   No matter the extent of geographic separateness, no college campus is an isolated entity. It is vital that the school maintain close relationships with agencies and institutions within the wider community that can supplement a school's resources and provide services. Many reports recommended that schools develop relationships via a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with community partners, such as law enforcement agencies and mental health providers.

6. Practice emergency plans and conduct training. (75%)

   It is not sufficient for a college or university simply to have an Emergency Response Plan in place. In order to be prepared for an emergency situation, reports recommend that schools practice and train for these plans. As shown in Figure 3, based on national survey data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the campus police departments at many schools, including community colleges, maintain various approaches to emergency preparedness activities. Half of the two-year schools and two-thirds of the four-year colleges engage in emergency preparedness exercises.



Figure 3: Campus Law Enforcement Emergency Preparedness Activities in the United States, by School Level

7. <u>Educate and train students, faculty, and staff about mass notification systems, and their roles and responsibilities in an emergency</u>. (70%)

   It is important to be prepared for what may occur in the event of an emergency. Many campuses use mass notification systems, but these will have limited effectiveness if students, faculty, and staff are not aware that they exist or do not understand how they work. For this reason, many reports recommend that students, faculty, and staff should be educated about the mass notification system and what to do in an emergency. Student orientations and faculty/staff training sessions provide opportunities to familiarize the campus community with these and other emergency response procedures.

8. <u>Educate faculty, staff, and students about recognizing and responding to signs of mental illness and other potential threats</u>. (60%)

   As always, the best defense against violence is to prevent it from happening in the first place. Reports recommend educating faculty, staff, and students about how to recognize and respond to the signs of mental illness and other threats. This will greatly increase the chances of getting at-risk individuals the help they need before their troubles explode into violence. Not only might such intervention reduce the occurrence of violence against others, but it can also help prevent other destructive behaviors, such as suicide and substance abuse.

9. Conduct risk and safety assessments. (60%)

   For a school to protect its community to the greatest extent possible, it must identify its safety and security weaknesses and address them proactively. Reports recommend that assessments should be conducted on a regular basis to ensure that safety and security programs on campus are sound.

10. Have an interoperable communication system with all area responders. (55%)

   Because schools need to be able to communicate with outside agencies in the event of an emergency, it is not surprising that most reports recommended that communications systems should be interoperable (i.e., compatible) with outside agencies. For instance, the campus police department should be able to communicate with local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical responders through a compatible radio system.

11. Ensure that all responder agencies are trained in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). (50%)

   NIMS is a system that has been adopted by both governmental and nongovernmental agencies that provides a framework for responding to emergencies such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks. The framework has several components, including incident command, resource management, and communications and information management. ICS is a management concept within the NIMS framework; it defines personnel roles and responsibilities during a crisis. By providing standard response and operation and procedures, ICS makes it possible for agencies that normally do not work together to achieve an efficient, coordinated efficient response. Reports suggest that emergency personnel should use and be trained in these systems to minimize miscommunication and other problems that can occur during campus emergencies.

Massachusetts best practices

In order to gather information about established best practices currently in place at Massachusetts public colleges and universities, the team visited five campuses that were known to have well-established violence prevention measures. These schools — University of Massachusetts Amherst, Fitchburg State College, Salem State College, Bridgewater State College and Mt. Wachusett Community College — represent the range of institution types within the Massachusetts system. Many of the best practices identified for each of these campuses are listed here.

University of Massachusetts Amherst

1. UMass Amherst has entered into a legally binding mutual aid agreement with two of the towns surrounding the university. Crime data are shared between communities and after-action meetings are conducted with all departments every Monday.
2. The University has also established an Assessment and Care Team (ACT). This is a multi-departmental group that meets on a weekly basis to discuss individuals who have exhibited threatening or potentially violent behavior. The team identifies and promptly investigates individuals who may pose a threat to the campus community. The ACT includes representatives from:
    a. UMass Police
    b. Residential life
    c. Counseling services
    d. Faculty
    e. Ombuds officer
    f. Graduate school dean
    g. Undergraduate school dean
    h. Director of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention
    i. Undergraduate academic advisor
3. The UMass Police has received free on-site training from the FBI in interpreting violent writing.
4. The University has installed 500 closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras on campus. Every main entrance perimeter door is equipped with a camera. Digital images are stored on digital video recorders in the Central Command Station. The Chief of Police sends out video clips via e-mail to all students immediately following an incident, resulting in a perfect clearance rate for these incidents. Camera images are also available in police vehicles via laptop computer. The cameras have proven to be an effective tool at deterring and solving crime on campus. Armed robbery and other violent crime statistics have dropped significantly since the installation of the cameras.
5. The University is also installing video analytics on certain cameras on campus.
6. A representative from the UMass Police is included in the design of all new buildings on campus. They are involved early in the schematic design phase so that Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) techniques are included in the projects. The proper placement and type of CCTV and access control devices are also determined with input from the UMass Police. This ensures that seamless integration with existing systems is possible.
7. The University has published policies on how students should react if there is a shooter on campus. The policies are posted on the UMass Police website at: *http://www.umass.edu/umpd/emergencyprocedures/activethreat/*

Bridgewater State College

1. The College mandates that all bags are to be searched prior to entering residence halls. Originally designed to prevent alcohol smuggling, this procedure is helpful in keeping weapons from being brought into the dormitories.
2. The College has a Care Team that consists of personnel from the following departments:
   a. Campus Police Department
   b. School Administration
   c. Counseling Services
   d. Residence Life
   e. Others as required
3. The College has an anonymous tip line, as well as a method for anonymously reporting suspicious and violent behavior via the web.
4. In addition to the Care Team, the College has a Crisis Response Team that actively investigates and follows up on reported incidents and individuals.
5. The College has a comprehensive mass notification program in place. This includes voice notification, e-mail, text, web messaging and desktop messaging. Landline phones are installed in nearly every classroom and the school is currently considering installing digital output devices in all classrooms. Written mass notification policies are published, and messages are only sent in the event of an emergency.
6. All police vehicles contain assault rifles and shotguns. All police have received advanced training with these weapons, including two forms of Active Shooter Response Training conducted by the Massachusetts State Police and a private security firm.
7. The College has purchased door-breaching rounds and non-lethal rounds, both of which can be fired from shotguns.
8. Communication infrastructure is backed up and available offsite during emergencies. This includes the police department website.
9. During investigations police officers search student gossip sites, such as *juicycampus.com* and *campusgossip.com*.

Fitchburg State College

1. Fitchburg State College has hired an outside firm to conduct a campus risk assessment. The police, IT and facilities departments use this assessment document as a blueprint for security upgrades and planning.
2. The College utilizes *Connect Ed* for mass notification. All messages are voice-based; however, they have the ability to send text, e-mail and web notifications. Students are sent one test message per year in the form of a greeting from the President of the College.
3. Police vehicles have AR-15 assault rifles, a campus master key in a vehicle lock box, bolt cutters and door breaching equipment.

4. The Chief of Police is a member of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).
5. Campus police officers have received free on-site Active Shooter Response Training conducted by the Massachusetts State Police.
6. The Chief of Police chairs weekly meetings of the Threat Assessment Team in order to assess the threat of violence on campus. Members of the team include:
    a. Director of Counseling
    b. Director of Health Services
    c. Dean of Students
    d. Director of Housing
    e. Director of Auxiliary Services
    f. Representatives from the Department of Mediation and Student Justice

Salem State College

1. Over 100 emergency call stations have been installed on campus. All stations are checked for proper operation on a weekly basis.
2. The police officers have advanced equipment including weapons, cars, radios, segways, vests, and other equipment.
3. Landline phones are installed in all 163 classrooms.
4. All incoming students register for the mass notification system.
5. Members of the Threat Assessment Team include:
    a. Director of Counseling Services
    b. Chief of Police
    c. Assistant Dean of Students
    d. Assistant Dean of Minority Students
    e. Director of Residents Life
    f. Alcohol counselor
6. Police have tools to open doors forcibly.
7. The College has a Central Command Center with CCTV, interoperable radios, and a dispatch system. The Center also handles 911 overflow from the town of Salem.

Mount Wachusett Community College

1. The College has a Threat Assessment Team that reviews and investigates potentially violent individuals.
2. The College mandates enrollment in the mass notification system. Individuals may choose to opt out of the system but must do so in writing and have a valid reason for doing so. The system is only used for emergencies and school closures in the middle of the day.

3. Campus police officers attended Active Shooter Response Training conducted by the Massachusetts State Police.
4. The College maintains a *Be Safe Plan* in every building and in every police vehicle. This plan is a blueprint of all buildings on the campus, including photos and as-built drawings.
5. Some faculty members have received violence prevention training.
6. The College utilizes the Government Emergency Telecom Service (GETS) card, which allows for priority calling if phone lines are clogged during an emergency. This is a free service provided by the Department of Homeland Security.
7. The Chief of Police is armed and the College is moving toward arming all officers.

SECTION THREE

EXISTING CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION PRACTICES IN MASSACHUSETTS

CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION EXISTING CONDITIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS

Overview: In this section, we present the results of our survey of existing safety and security conditions at Massachusetts public colleges and universities.

*****

In order to gain a sense of existing safety and violence prevention conditions at Massachusetts public institutions of higher education, we conducted an on-line survey of colleges and universities throughout the state. Appendix D provides the entire instrument with summary tabulations of the responses.

We surveyed all 29 schools in the system, but four schools did not respond to the survey request by the cut-off date of May 28, 2008. The results reported in this section are therefore based on the 25 schools that did respond, representing 90 percent of the state's public college student population.

The 29 solicited schools are all part of the Massachusetts public college and university system. No private institutions were included in the sample. The survey contained 133 questions, which inquired about a variety of safety and security issues ranging from early detection and prevention to emergency response.

Of the 25 respondent schools, 56 percent identified themselves as either Urban or Inner City; less than 5 percent are rural. Sixty-two percent of the schools have a student population greater than 5,000, and over 80 percent have campuses that span more than 25 acres in land area.

1. Early Detection and Prevention

Mental health training is a key component of early detection and prevention. Ninety-one percent of the surveyed institutions report an increase of students with severe psychiatric problems in recent years.

Of the surveyed schools, 80 percent provided mental health training for health care staff, 77 percent provided it for residential staff, 48 percent provide it for student affairs personnel, 48 percent provided it for campus police officers, and 22 percent provided it for faculty (see Figure 4).



Figure 4: Percentage of Massachusetts Public Colleges and Universities Providing Mental Health Services to Various Employee Groups

Eighty-three percent of the schools provide on-campus mental health services for students, and of these schools, 57 percent provide specialized services (e.g., substance abuse, suicide prevention, eating disorders) rather than just generalized services. Eighty-two percent of the schools have counselors that can see students immediately (i.e., same-day) in the event of a crisis. One-third of the schools have a waiting period of five or more days for non-emergency appointments at the counseling center. Ninety-one percent of the schools have Student-in-Need referral programs. Unfortunately, seventy-three percent do not provide mental health services outside of normal business hours (i.e., nights and weekends) (see Recommendations #1 and #2 in Section Four).

All of the surveyed schools have Employee Assistance Programs available for employees. However, only 52 percent make such programs available for contract workers.

Seventy-seven percent of the schools do not have a psychiatrist on staff or readily available. Ninety-percent do not have an accredited counseling center.

Eighty-one percent of the schools do not submit potentially violent writings, drawings and other forms of individual expression to a forensic behavioral science expert for review (see Recommendation #3).

With respect to privacy and information sharing laws, 95 percent of schools have on staff someone with a detailed understanding of HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), and all schools employ someone with a detailed understanding of FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act).

2. Physical and Electronic Security

Eighty-three percent of the surveyed schools have a campus-wide master key system. Over half of the schools (58%) have exterior doors that are in need of repair or replacement (see Recommendation #4). Nine percent of schools have dormitories with exterior doors that cannot be closed and locked. Sixty-one percent of the schools still have lever action doors that can be locked together from the inside with chains. Seventy percent of schools report that classrooms and office doors cannot be locked from the inside. Seventy-five percent of schools do not have a campus-wide physical security program that allows for remote locking/unlocking of doors (see Recommendation #5). And 71 percent of schools report having no procedure or physical method in place for securing buildings that are vulnerable to attack.

Fifty-four percent of schools do not employ CCTV cameras on campus (see Recommendation #6). However, 80 percent of schools do employ a "Blue Light" or similar emergency call system on campus.

Seventy-six percent of schools do not have in-class/in-lab emergency signaling capabilities, such as emergency call stations or intercoms (see Recommendation #7).

3. Campus Police Department

Only 52 percent of schools train their campus police officers in active shooter response tactics (see Recommendation #8). Thirty-six percent of school police departments do not have an active shooter plan in place. Sixty-four percent of schools have never conducted active shooter drills. Of those schools that have conducted such drills, none of them have involved students.

Seventy-six percent of schools have a dedicated command facility for police, and 76 percent of schools employ fewer than 25 campus police officers. All schools have campus police officers trained in first aid and CPR.

As shown in Figure 5, 80 percent of the schools have sworn police officers. Eighty-four percent have campus police officers who carry "less-than-lethal" weapons, and only one-third of schools have campus police officers who carry firearms (see Recommendation #10).



Figure 5: Percentage of Massachusetts Public Colleges and Universities with Officers that are Sworn, Carry Less-Than-Lethal Weapons, and Carry Firearms

Eighty percent of school police departments do not have equipment necessary to forcibly gain entry into locked buildings or classrooms (see Recommendation #11).

4. Mass Notification

All schools report having mass notification technology. As can be seen in Figure 6, various types of notification systems are used, with e-mail and phone systems being the most commonplace.

Seventy-six percent of schools report that they have used their mass notification system already, either as a test or under actual emergency conditions.

Forty-one percent of schools report that their communications equipment is not interoperable with local law enforcement agencies, and two-thirds report that their communications equipment is not interoperable with Federal law enforcement or emergency management agencies (see Recommendation #12).

One-third of the schools do not have a formal policy for use of their mass notification system (see Recommendation #13).



Figure 6: Percentage of Massachusetts Public Colleges and Universities with Mass Notification by Type of System

5. Policies and Procedures

One-third of the schools do not have a formal policy in place regarding what faculty and staff should do if they have concerns about a student or colleague who appears to have the potential for becoming violent (see Recommendation #14). Notably, 70 percent of schools do not specifically train faculty and staff on how to recognize risk factors for students and employees who may pose a significant risk of violence (see Recommendation #15).

Fifty-six percent of schools do not have a program for training particular faculty, staff and students for special responsibility in security awareness and procedures (e.g., passing on critical information, securing the classroom, acting as fire wardens, etc.) in response to crises (see Recommendation #17).

Twenty percent of schools do not include public safety as part of the orientation process for incoming students (see Recommendation #18).

Sixty-four percent of schools do not routinely conduct pre-entry screening of students for special needs, mental health, and criminal background (see Recommendation #19).

Eighty-eight percent of schools have not conducted a vulnerability assessment of their campus (see Recommendation #20).

One-third of schools do not have a mutual aid agreement with neighboring law enforcement agencies, and 48 percent do not have mutual aid agreements with

surrounding communities for emergency medical training or support (see Recommendation #21).

Sixty-four percent of schools do not have a "Tip Hotline" to allow for anonymous reporting of suspicious behavior (see Recommendation #22).

All schools report having a policy dealing with weapons on campus. And all schools have a policy regarding Clery Act compliance.

6. Emergency Response

All schools report having an Emergency Response Plan (ERP). However, 18 percent of schools report that they do not review their ERP for changes in conditions, personnel, and positions at least once per year (see Recommendation #23).

Only 65 percent of the schools have a Threat Assessment Team (TAT) (see Recommendation #24). At each school with a TAT, the team is comprised of representatives from various departments and specialties. However, as can be seen in Figure 7, 88 percent of schools with a TAT do not have legal representation on the team (see Recommendation #25). More specifically, 75 percent of schools report that they do not have an attorney on the TAT who can discuss privacy and confidentiality issues, facilitate obtaining court injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders, and assist in preparing legal documents to deal with potentially dangerous situations.



Figure 7: Percentage of Massachusetts Public Colleges and Universities with Particular Representatives on the Threat Assessment Team

Sixty-five percent of the schools report that they do not have a trained behavioral health Trauma Response Team (see Recommendation #26). Of those schools that do have such a team, 29 percent have their team located off-campus, and two-thirds of these off-campus teams have not been oriented to the culture and resources of the college or university.

SECTION FOUR

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

CAMPUS SAFETY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview: In this section we present our recommendations for enhancing campus safety and violence prevention. These recommendations are based upon a comparison of our survey results (discussed in the previous section) with previously established best practices for campus safety and violence prevention (highlighted in Section Two, and are listed out in Appendix B). In this sense, our recommendations are tailored to the schools that we surveyed and the ways in which their campus security and violence prevention efforts can be improved. If all or most of the schools are already implementing a well-established best practice, such as having an Emergency Response Plan (ERP), then this practice is not listed among our recommendations as it would be superfluous.

The recommendations made here are designed as best practices for public colleges and universities in Massachusetts. However, some of the prescriptions may be impractical for smaller schools, especially community colleges. For example, it would be beyond the capacity, if not the need, of small schools to have in-house legal council, sworn campus police officers, or staff psychiatrists. The lack of such resources should not be interpreted as a substandard level of violence preparedness. However, in such instances, schools can and should seek alternative resources in the local area or establish cooperative agreements with nearby institutions for resource sharing.

The recommendations are organized into six parts: 1) Early Detection and Prevention; 2) Physical and Electronic Security; 3) Campus Police Department; 4) Mass Notification; 5) Policies and Procedures; and 6) Emergency Response.

*****

1. Early Detection and Prevention

Mental Health Services

> **Recommendation #1: Campus mental health services should be clearly available and easily accessible to students.**
>
> We recommend that all students have easy access to mental health services. This access may be obtained either through on-campus services or through strong institutional relationships with community mental health providers able to assist the campus community. Clearly, off-campus services should be located geographically close to the college. The *specific* location of these services (on- or off-campus) may be less critical than the ease of access to those services. Promotion of mental health support (e.g., through signage, the school website, and printed documentation) can encourage the students' use of these services.

Mental health services for students should be provided by qualified and trained individuals (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, etc.) who adhere to accreditation-level standards of care. When possible, campus counseling services should be accredited and should meet the staffing ratio recommended by the International Association of Counseling Services (IACS): 1,500 students to each mental health worker. There should be a sufficient number of service providers to ensure short waiting periods and timely response. Notably, one-third of the schools we surveyed have a waiting period of five days or more for non-emergency appointments.

Because of the importance of mental health services, access to treatment should be available on an emergency basis as well as during regular business hours. Each school should have a procedure in place for providing emergency mental health care, and for engaging the ongoing participation of campus mental health services when a student presents with a mental health emergency. In the event of such an emergency, schools should provide mental health services outside of normal business hours (i.e., nights and weekends). Unfortunately, seventy-three percent of the schools we surveyed do not have around-the-clock availability.

Recommendation #2: **Schools should offer specialized mental health services, not just generalized services.**

Decades ago, virtually all behavioral difficulties were treated through some form of counseling. Today, best practices dictate different forms of intervention for different types of psychological and behavioral difficulties. For example, depression may be treated differently than an eating disorder. Because students present with a variety of mental health ailments, colleges and universities should offer a reasonably specialized array of mental health services. Despite this, forty-three percent of the schools we surveyed offer only generalized counseling services. Offering specialized services may actually be one method of encouraging help-seeking behaviors. Students seeking help for an identified problem (such as anger management) may be discouraged by a lack of specialized care (or at least appropriate referrals for such).

The range of specialized services offered may reasonably vary depending upon factors such as the size of the college or university, the school's resources, the geographical setting, the psychological services contracted by the campus with outside service providers, etc.

Violent expression

Recommendation #3: **Writings, drawings, and other forms of individual expression reflecting violent fantasy and causing a faculty member to be**

fearful or concerned about safety, should be evaluated contextually for any potential threat.

Eighty-five percent of the schools surveyed do not submit violent materials for evaluation and have not identified resources with violent writing analysis expertise. While recognizing the creative context of higher education, we recommend that schools evaluate writings, drawings, and other forms of expression reflecting violent fantasy. Schools should establish a formal policy which provides faculty members with a means to submit materials with disturbing violent content to the Threat Assessment Team (see Recommendation #24). The FBI National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, police agencies with similar behavioral analysis resources, and local forensic psychologists and psychiatrists can also be contacted as additional resources.

It is important to emphasize how difficult it is to predict violent behavior, especially in its most extreme form. Countless students write about violent themes, listen to disturbing music, and are isolated or socially awkward. Yet the vast majority of these individuals will never become violent in any way. This "false positive" dilemma dictates constrained response to unconventional behavior. Thus, the Threat Assessment Team must be well-trained in balancing individual expression with campus safety concerns.

2. Physical and Electronic Security

Doors

Recommendation #4: Schools should ensure that all exterior doors are properly constructed and lockable.

Outside door construction can afford an attacker the opportunity to chain doors to one another, preventing victims from escaping from the building and hindering police in their attempt to enter the building to confront and stop the attacker. Schools should make sure that all exterior doors to buildings are properly constructed and functional. Over half (58%) of the schools we surveyed have exterior doors that are in need of repair or replacement.

As shown in Figure 8, colleges around the country are using locks and other means for securing dormitories. All dormitories should be equipped with exterior doors that can be closed and locked in order to prevent unauthorized individuals from entering. Nine percent of the surveyed schools have dormitories with exterior doors that cannot be closed and locked.

Hardware on exterior doors (such as push bar lever doors) should be checked to ensure they cannot be chained shut. Sixty-one percent of the schools we

surveyed still have lever action doors that can be locked together from the inside with chains.

A few of the existing reports discussed in Section Two recommended installing interior locking devices in all classrooms. There are pros and cons to this strategy. Locking classroom doors from the inside may provide safety for large numbers of people during an active shooter event. However, it may also increase the risk and consequences of other forms of violence, such as sexual assault. Therefore, we only recommend that this be a topic of discussion for individual campuses to consider.



Figure 8: National Practices in Dormitory Security

<u>Recommendation #5</u>: Schools should develop a reasonable plan for electronic access control in the event of an emergency.

Seventy-five percent of schools do not have a campus-wide physical security program that allows for remote locking/unlocking of doors. It is extremely important for schools to establish controlled access to campus buildings. Control of persons not having business in specific buildings should be limited. Access to residence halls should be only possible with swipe cards or other security means. Any plan for electronic access control should recognize the unique challenges of the campus environment.

"Campus Lockdown" is the new catchphrase on campus security, although a largely inappropriate one given its origins in correctional nomenclature. Still, the concept is frequently raised in parental inquiries about safety procedures. Based on the *Reader's Digest* survey of 135 colleges and universities throughout the country, a majority of schools report having a full or partial "lockdown" plan in place (see Figure 2 in Section Two). In contrast, only 29 percent of the

schools we surveyed reported having a procedure or physical method in place for securing buildings that are vulnerable to attack.

Leaving aside the impossibility of truly locking down a sprawling campus, most college shootings take place in one location—in just one building, if not just one classroom. Notwithstanding the unique lull in between the first and second shootings in the Virginia Tech case, it is also true that campus shooting sprees typically begin and end so quickly that locking students in dorms and classrooms and turning away off-campus students would not necessarily help. Furthermore, there is a significant downside of sealing off access to buildings during an active shooter episode. Although a gunman loose on campus grounds may not be able to enter classrooms and other buildings, so too would potential victims be left stranded without refuge if stalked by the assailant.

Surveillance

Recommendation #6: Schools should install CCTV cameras throughout their campuses.

Fifty-four percent of the surveyed schools do not employ CCTV cameras on campus. Properly employed cameras, coupled with well formulated policies, can enhance the safety and security of the campus. Cameras alone do not alleviate all problems. Cameras must be monitored to be effective in spotting criminal activity as it is occurring, and in most cases cameras are useful only in a forensic, post-incident manner. Camera images must be recorded to perform these functions with rapid playback and frame capture capabilities.

We recommend that schools have discussions about the role of cameras on campus before installation. The use of CCTV has generated debates on privacy concerns and the impact of cameras on campus climate. While recognizing these concerns, the wide-ranging benefits generally appear to outweigh them.

Emergency signaling

Recommendation #7: Schools should equip all classrooms with emergency signaling/notification capabilities.

Seventy-six percent of schools do not have in-class/in-lab emergency signaling capabilities. However, some colleges have landlines installed in every classroom. The ability to reach all areas of the campus, particularly where cell phone coverage is either unavailable or not allowed, is paramount to the ability to notify all students and faculty of situations requiring their response. It is also beneficial for emergency responders to receive real-time information from classrooms in the event of an emergency. Additional or alternative signaling

systems in classrooms include panic buttons and digital displays that can transmit messages from a central location to the classrooms.

3. Campus Police Department

Active shooter response

Recommendation #8: Campus police departments should have up-to-date active shooter response plans in place and train their officers in active shooter response tactics.

Though the risk of school shooting is very small, it is also very real and schools must be prepared for the event. Only 64 percent of the schools we surveyed have campus police departments with an active shooter plan in place and only 52 percent train their campus police officers in active shooter response tactics. Sixty-four percent of the schools have never conducted active shooter drills, which contrasts with the majority of schools around the country (see Figure 3).

Of those Massachusetts schools that have conducted such drills, none have involved students. We strongly endorse the practice of excluding students. Nationally, some schools use student volunteers as victims, lying still in pools of fake blood, while others huddle in corners waiting out the realistic drama. Given the incredibly low risk of a mass shooting actually occurring, involving students in drills is not worth the potential emotional trauma they may experience as a result. However, we do recommend that students be briefed on the appropriate actions to take in the event of a shooter on campus. This includes evacuation when possible; finding shelter in place when evacuation is not possible, and attempting to neutralize the shooter if directly confronted by the assailant.

It is also important that these plans be updated to reflect current techniques, tactics, and policies. For example, at one time the universal response tactic for active shooters was for law enforcement officers to surround the perimeter of a building and control access and egress until a trained tactical unit arrived on the scene. Today, the "best practice" response is for the first group of officers to form an impromptu tactical team and aggressively confront and neutralize the attacker. It has been proven through numerous drills and exercises that this type of rapid response is a necessary and prudent response to active shooters on campus.

The active shooter plan should be coordinated with local and state law enforcement agencies that may jointly respond to such incidents. Joint agency drills and exercises should be conducted on a regular basis. The Massachusetts State Police offers an Active Shooter Training Program at no cost to colleges and universities in the state. This includes on-site classroom instruction and

hands-on exercises with simunition rounds (“less-than-lethal” training rounds fired from weapons carried by the law enforcement officers). It is highly recommended that all public colleges and universities take advantage of this service.

Staffing, weapons and equipment

<u>Recommendation #9</u>: **Campus safety staffing levels should be adequate for the size and character of the school.**

No firm standards have been established for campus safety staffing levels. Still, the national averages shown in Figure 9 do provide some rough guidelines. Other than campus size, a school’s location in terms of local crime levels and the closeness and availability of outside law enforcement resources are critical variables for determining staffing needs. Once a school’s needs have been assessed, staffing options may include campus police officers, proprietary security staff, contract security staff, and/or mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement agencies. In addition, staffing levels and assignments should recognize the relatively higher risk of violence during the late-night hours at residential campuses (see Figure 1 in Section One) as well as coverage for special events such as rallies, concerts, and athletic competitions.



Figure 9: Average Campus Police Staffing Levels by School Size and Type in the United States

<u>Recommendation #10</u>: Sworn campus police officers should be armed and trained in the use of personal or specialized firearms.

Of the colleges and universities we surveyed, 80 percent have sworn law enforcement officers. Only one-third of the schools have officers who carry firearms, and 84 percent have officers who carry "less-than-lethal" weapons. Some controversy remains over whether schools should have armed officers on campus. According to the *Reader's Digest* survey of colleges and universities throughout the country, about 40 percent of private schools and about 80 percent of public schools employ armed campus police officers (see Figure 10).



Figure 10: Trends in Armed Campus Police Officers in the United States

Given the enormous consequences of a campus shooting (previously discussed in this report), coupled with the nationally recognized and proven best practice response requiring the first officers on the scene to neutralize the shooter aggressively, it is highly recommend that all police officers on campus be armed and trained in the use of personal and specialized firearms. This includes tactical rifles and shotguns.

The purpose of appropriate weaponry is to minimize injury and loss of life during a catastrophic incident. Because campus shooters often employ sophisticated weapons, campus police officers must have access to appropriate armament.

<u>Recommendation #11</u>: Schools should ensure that the campus police department has the equipment necessary to gain forcible entry into locked buildings and classrooms.

Our survey revealed that 80 percent of the schools' police departments do not have the equipment necessary to forcibly gain entry into locked buildings or classrooms. We recommend that campus police officers have ready access to door-breaching equipment.

4. Mass Notification

Interoperability

Recommendation #12: Schools should have a communications system that is interoperable with outside agencies.

Forty-one percent of the surveyed schools report that their communications equipment is not interoperable with local law enforcement agencies, and two-thirds report that their communications equipment is not interoperable with Federal law enforcement or emergency management agencies. Schools must to be able to communicate with outside agencies in the event of an emergency. Therefore, their communications systems must be interoperable (i.e., compatible) with outside agencies. For instance, the campus police department should be able to communicate with local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical responders through compatible radio systems.

Policy and practice

Recommendation #13: Schools should establish a formal policy for use of their mass notification system.

One-third of the schools do not have a formal policy for use of their mass notification system. In such cases, there is no guidance about what kinds of events should initiate the use of the system, who is authorized to launch the system, who should be notified, and what information should be provided.

Multiple means of mass notification are important because no one notification system will reach all community members. Text and phone messaging systems are desirable but not sufficient because these devices are not universal, reliable, or always active. Therefore, schools should have in place additional communication systems, such as intercom, web and desktop messaging, and landlines and/or electronic message boards in classrooms. In addition, colleges should engage in a series of exercises to eliminate unforeseen system glitches.

5. Policies and Procedures

Referral Policy

Recommendation #14: **Schools should have in place a formal policy outlining how and to whom faculty and staff should refer students who appear to have the potential for becoming violent.**

One-third of the surveyed schools do not have in place a policy outlining what steps faculty and staff should take if they have concerns about a student or colleague who appears to have the potential for becoming violent. Sixty-four percent do not have a policy regarding evaluations of students and employees who have been identified by faculty/staff as a potential risk.

Processes for referring a student for mental health services should not be onerous or lengthy. Campuses should provide simple and efficient methods for reporting students who may be at risk.

Training and orientation

Recommendation #15: **Faculty and staff should receive training in identifying students at risk.**

Seventy percent of the schools do not specifically train faculty and staff on how to recognize risk factors for students and employees who may pose a risk of violence. Such training, importantly, should not imply that personnel outside mental health fields should make psychological judgments. Rather, such training should focus on assisting faculty and staff in identifying the most obvious behavioral indicators and in making appropriate referrals.

Recommendation #16: **Faculty and staff should receive training in managing difficult interactions and situations.**

Many individuals are inexperienced in responding to challenging interpersonal situations and would benefit from training on how to diffuse rather than escalate conflict. In addition, faculty should be encouraged to examine closely the proper use and limits of their influence over the livelihood of students and fellow faculty. Through grading authority and other assessments, faculty hold considerable power over the lives and advancement of undergraduate and graduate students, as well as colleagues. Especially if insulated by tenure, they may fail to maintain perspective on the proper limits of this power.

Recommendation #17: **Faculty and staff should be informed about the appropriate protocol in the event of a crisis.**

During an emergency, some individuals may render aid but others should be aware that their presence may, in fact, hinder emergency response efforts. Our survey shows that 56 percent of schools do not have a program for informing faculty and staff about appropriate crisis response protocols. We believe that all personnel should understand their particular roles and responsibilities in such situations. However, exactly what these roles and responsibilities should be is openly debatable, depending upon various factors, such as the type of personnel (e.g., administrative versus faculty). Therefore, we believe that the precise nature of this training would be an appropriate topic for a roundtable discussion.

Recommendation #18: **Schools should include public safety as part of the orientation process.**

Twenty percent of schools do not include public safety as part of the orientation process for incoming students. Because the actions students take can strongly impact their own safety as well as the safety of others, schools should take advantage of orientation as a prime opportunity to advise students about public safety. For example, students should be informed about the emergency mass notification system and how to report potentially dangerous individuals or situations.

Orientation sessions are also an opportunity to promote a positive social environment, which may, in the long run, be the best defense against campus violence and aggression. When students enter a college environment, they are often receptive to attempts to promote networks and campus groups and they should be encouraged to do so. Transition and orientation programs, which target major challenges on campus with practical information, can serve as important forums to promote nonviolence.

Screening student applicants

Recommendation #19: **Graduate student applicants should be directly queried regarding any unusual academic histories, as well as criminal records and disciplinary actions.**

Sixty-four percent of the surveyed schools do not routinely screen student applicants. Such screening is very important, since many indicators of potential violent behavior can be found long before students enter college. This is why the undergraduate application for Massachusetts public colleges includes questions regarding criminal history and past school-based disciplinary actions.

Based upon the disproportionate involvement of graduate students in campus shootings, we recommend that special attention be paid during the graduate admission process. The applications for at least some of the state's public graduate schools do not include questions about past criminal offenses and academic infractions. We strongly recommend that all graduate admissions applications include such inquiries. In addition, certain red flags, such as having no references from previously attended schools or having attended multiple schools for short periods of time, should be closely examined.

Vulnerability assessment

Recommendation #20: Schools should conduct vulnerability assessments at least once per year.

"Vulnerability" refers to weaknesses or gaps within a system. Identifying and addressing potential campus-wide vulnerabilities is an essential part of safety planning. Effective vulnerability assessments are fluid and should be repeated on a regular basis as threat levels change, operating systems are updated, and new security countermeasures become available. Eighty-eight percent of the surveyed schools have not conducted a vulnerability assessment of their campus. At a minimum, site-specific vulnerabilities should be assessed in the following areas:

Human Security (e.g., police, security officers, etc.)

Physical Security (e.g., walls, fences, barriers, doors, locks, etc.)

Electronic Security (e.g., access control, CCTV, alarms, mass notification systems, etc.)

Security Policies and Procedures (e.g., weapons policy, Emergency Response Plans, etc.)

Information Technology Security (e.g., networks, databases, etc.)

Redundancy (e.g., back-up for critical systems, data, etc.)

MOU's and contracts

Recommendation #21: **Schools should form mutual aid agreements or have Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's) with agencies in the community having necessary support resources, such as mental health service providers, emergency medical response services, and law enforcement agencies.**

When a major crisis occurs, school emergency support services are usually overwhelmed by demands placed on them, such as large the number of victims requiring immediate assistance. Schools can use local partnerships to supplement their resources if they have a mutual aid agreement with neighboring law enforcement agencies, and may depend on their aid in the event of emergencies.

Of the schools surveyed, 30 percent do not have a mutual aid agreement with neighboring law enforcement agencies and forty-five percent do not have mutual aid with surrounding communities for emergency medical support and joint training.

Anonymous reporting

Recommendation #22: **Schools should have multiple reporting systems that permit campus community members to report suspicious behavior anonymously and conveniently.**

An important goal of any violence prevention effort is, and must be, to encourage reporting of troubling behaviors which may increase the risk of violence. This recommendation addresses two obstacles that frequently discourage reporting. First, reporters disclosing troubling behavior by potentially violent individuals are particularly susceptible, with good reason, to fears of retaliation. Second, reporters are often uncertain about their own abilities to judge a person's risk for violence and this uncertainty may lead them to abandon reporting if it is cumbersome or difficult. An anonymous and convenient reporting method addresses both reporter concerns about retaliation and convenience.

Fortunately, many technologies exist that readily permit such reporting methods. Schools may employ telephone hotlines, anonymous mailboxes, e-mail and messaging tips, and online forms. Redundancy is important: again, with the goal being to encourage reporting, reporters should have a variety of methods from which to choose.

Sixty-four percent of the surveyed schools do not have a Tip Hotline that allows for anonymous reporting of suspicious behavior. A review of the schools'

websites revealed that most of the colleges and universities in this report either did not have anonymous online reporting forms, had such forms but they requested contact information (i.e., were not anonymous), or the forms were difficult to locate online. Telephone hotline numbers should be reproduced in signage, shown on webpages, and printed in materials such as those distributed at student orientations. Online anonymous reporting forms should be prominent on the school safety website, should clarify upfront that contact information is not required, and should be easily located within three to four clicks from the school's homepage. Although e-mail is typically not as anonymous, e-mail tip addresses should also be displayed. It is important to note that for this and subsequent generations, the school's website is likely to be the first source of information for a potential reporter.

6. Emergency Response

Update the Emergency Response Plan

Recommendation #23: **Every college and university should review and update its Emergency Response Plan (ERP) on a regular basis.**

As discussed in Section Three of this report, having an Emergency Response Plan (ERP) was the number-one top recommended best practice according to previous reports on campus safety and violence prevention. All of the schools we surveyed have an ERP in place. However, we found that 18 percent of the schools do not review their ERP for changes in conditions, personnel, and positions at least once per year. Considering the various changes that campuses undergo from year to year, including changes in student and employee populations, as well as physical changes to the campus such as new buildings and renovations, it is critical that the ERP be reviewed annually, if not more frequently.

Threat Assessment Team

Recommendation #24: **Every school should form, train and maintain a Threat Assessment Team (TAT).**

Another national best practice is the establishment of a multidisciplinary team, commonly referred to as a TAT. Sixty-five percent of the schools in our survey of Massachusetts public colleges and universities currently have a TAT in place.

When notified of a threat or potential danger, this team should have the authority and capacity to draw upon university sources as needed to evaluate the potential risk.

The team should be empowered to take actions such as conducting additional investigation, gathering background information, identifying warning signs, establishing a threat potential risk level (low to high), preparing a case to obtain court injunctive relief (for instance, a Temporary Restraining Order) or for hearings (for instance, a mental health commitment hearing), and recommending that those who are at risk for victimization be warned.

The TAT should plan a course of action for dealing with the presenting problem and furnish recommendations to the appropriate college officials.

TATs are distinct from groups maintained by some schools to respond proactively to the needs of students who present a risk of suicide or other life- or health-threatening conditions, such as eating disorders and substance abuse. These self-destructive behaviors are far more prevalent on any college campus than violence. However, given the fact that violence carries a much wider impact on the campus community, there may be the temptation to prioritize the rare but extreme over the more common concerns. Thus, even though the composition and membership of teams focused on these two areas may overlap considerably, it is critical not to blend or confound the two functions.

<u>Recommendation #25</u>: **The TAT should consist of representatives from various departments and agencies, minimally comprised of student services and counseling staff, faculty, police, human resources personnel, and legal counsel.**

While most of the surveyed schools' Threat Assessment Teams include representatives from most of the departments and agencies mentioned above, 88 percent of them do not have legal representation. Attorneys can play an integral role in threat assessment and violence prevention and should be involved early in the process of dealing with more severe and credible threats. These professionals are familiar with privacy and confidentiality issues. They can also facilitate obtaining judicial injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders, and assist in preparing legal documents to handle potentially dangerous persons or situations. Therefore, attorneys should be either on the TAT or readily available to the TAT as needed.

Trauma Response Team

<u>Recommendation #26</u>: **Each school should have a trained behavioral health Trauma Response Team (TRT), either on campus or through a contract or formal agreement.**

Sixty-five percent of the surveyed schools report that they do not have a trained behavioral health TRT. While all schools have generalized counseling

services, a TRT is necessary because appropriate response to trauma cannot typically be addressed through these services. Such a team should follow an evidence-based or evidence-informed model of supporting individuals and groups following exposure to traumatic or highly disturbing incidents. Examples of such response models include Psychological First Aid (National Center for PTSD) and Post Traumatic Stress Management (Center for Trauma Psychology).

Of those schools that have assembled a TRT, 29 percent have their team located off-campus, and two-thirds of these off-campus teams have not been oriented to the culture and resources of the university. Whether the TRT is located on- or off-campus, it should be familiar with the school environment and its available resources.

Recommendation #27: **Schools should plan for victim services and aftermath issues.**

Colleges and universities need to plan for and provide appropriate support services to victims, their families and all others who have been affected by a crisis situation. Different approaches are needed to handle the immediate and long-term aftermath of a violent event. Schools must have access to adequately staffed and trained emergency medical services, which are essential during crises in which large numbers of casualties occur. Once the threat has been controlled, emergency medical personnel must work together efficiently to render aid to the injured and transport wounded victims to hospitals.

Different kinds of violent events result in different levels of need for victim services. Campuses should have personnel on staff to handle more common forms of violence, including sexual assaults and suicide. However, multi-casualty incidents place extraordinary demands on personnel and resources beyond the ability of most colleges to provide. Schools should assemble a list of outside resources and contacts that can be called upon for such contingencies. Finally, depending upon the nature of the episode, it may be important to manage the appropriate flow of information to students, families, and the media.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Pervasive media images of mass shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University have raised the specter of serious violence on college campuses. But by any measure, the risk of serious violence on campus is remarkably low, particularly in its most extreme form. Although the chances of serious violence may be remote, the potential consequences can be devastating and long-lasting. Colleges must respond proactively to the risk, as parents rightly expect a special level of care for their sons and daughters while they are away at school. Therefore, it is prudent and imperative that colleges take steps to ensure the safety of students as well as faculty and other employees.

Nevertheless, the costs — fiscal and otherwise — of any security measure should be considered when developing a safety plan. College and university officials must be wary of measures that penetrate the campus environment beyond what is reasonable. Not only do colleges face fiscal constraints limiting the expansion of security protection, but security measures should in part be governed by the community's desire for a free and open campus. Colleges and universities offer unique challenges to security because the nature of their existence depends upon a free flow of individuals and expression. Care must be taken not to reinforce exaggerated perceptions of vulnerability. Indeed, it is critical not to promote fear and anxiety while attempting to reduce risk. A prudent and well-conceived security plan should be designed around these considerations.

While shootings are the most visible forms of campus violence, they are clearly not the most common. Security practices must also focus on other, more commonplace, forms of violence such as sexual and physical assault. Current best practices, taken in combination with research, demonstrate the essential role of collaboration among all service providers in the prevention of violent incidents on college campuses. The benefits of this collaboration range far beyond identifying and intervening with persons at risk for extreme violence, but should also reduce statistically greater perils such as suicide and fatalities related to binge drinking and substance abuse.

This review of best practices and current research underlines the need for careful and measured planning for campus safety. Campus safety is not simple or universal; it requires an analysis of each school's unique situation, character, setting, population, and mission. The recommendations in this report should not be addressed in isolation; rather, they should be considered in the broader context of the campus's approach to prevention and security and should take into account the views and perspectives of a wide array of stakeholders in consultation with professionals and experts. Such collaborative efforts may ultimately offer the soundest security and safety plan for any institution of higher education.

APPENDIX A

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MASSACHUSETTS COLLEGES

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MASSACHUSETTS COLLEGES

1. Early Detection and Prevention

Recommendation #1: Campus mental health services should be clearly available and easily accessible to students.

Recommendation #2: Schools should offer specialized mental health services, not just generalized services.

Recommendation #3: Writings, drawings, and other forms of individual expression reflecting violent fantasy and causing a faculty member to be fearful or concerned about safety, should be evaluated contextually for any potential threat.

2. Physical and Electronic Security

Recommendation #4: Schools should ensure that all exterior doors are properly constructed and lockable.

Recommendation #5: Schools should develop a reasonable plan for electronic access control in the event of an emergency.

Recommendation #6: Schools should install CCTV cameras throughout their campuses.

Recommendation #7: Schools should equip all classrooms with emergency signaling/notification capabilities.

3. Campus Police Department

Recommendation #8: Campus police departments should have up-to-date active shooter response plans in place and train their officers in active shooter response tactics.

Recommendation #9: Campus safety staffing levels should be adequate for the size and character of the school.

Recommendation #10: Sworn campus police officers should be armed and trained in the use of personal or specialized firearms.

Recommendation #11: Schools should ensure that the campus police department has the equipment necessary to gain forcible entry into locked buildings and classrooms.

4. Mass Notification

Recommendation #12: Schools should have a communications system that is interoperable with outside agencies.

Recommendation #13: Schools should establish a formal policy for use of their mass notification system.

5. Policies and Procedures

Recommendation #14: Schools should have in place a formal policy outlining how and to whom faculty and staff should refer students who appear to have the potential for becoming violent.

Recommendation #15: Faculty and staff should receive training in identifying students at risk.

Recommendation #16: Faculty and staff should receive training in managing difficult interactions and situations.

Recommendation #17: Faculty and staff should be informed about the appropriate protocol in the event of a crisis.

Recommendation #18: Schools should include public safety as part of the orientation process.

Recommendation #19: Graduate student applicants should be directly queried regarding any unusual academic histories, as well as criminal records and disciplinary actions.

Recommendation #20: Schools should conduct vulnerability assessments at least once per year.

Recommendation #21: Schools should form mutual aid agreements or have Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's) with agencies in the community having necessary support resources, such as mental health service providers, emergency medical response services, and law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation #22: Schools should have multiple reporting systems that permit campus community members to report suspicious behavior anonymously and conveniently.

6. Emergency Response

Recommendation #23: Every college and university should review and update its Emergency Response Plan (ERP) on a regular basis.

Recommendation #24: Every school should form, train and maintain a Threat Assessment Team (TAT).

Recommendation #25: The TAT should consist of representatives from various departments and agencies, minimally comprised of student services and counseling staff, faculty, police, human resources personnel, and legal counsel.

Recommendation #26: Each school should have a trained behavioral health Trauma Response Team (TRT), either on campus or through a contract or formal agreement.

Recommendation #27: Schools should plan for victim services and aftermath issues.

APPENDIX B

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM EXISTING REPORTS ON CAMPUS VIOLENCE

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM EXISTING REPORTS ON CAMPUS VIOLENCE

Recommendations	AG's	COPS	Exp.	FL	IACLEA	IL	KY	MO	NJ	NM	NSU	NC	OK	PA	Rep. Pres.	U. of CA	U. of NC	VA Tech Panel	VA Work Grp	WI	
Create an all-hazards Emergency Response Plan	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	95%
Adopt an emergency mass notification and communications system	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	95%
Establish multidisciplinary team to respond to crises (e.g., Threat Assessment Team)	•		•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•	•	80%
Review and train personnel regarding privacy/info sharing policies such as FERPA and HIPAA	•		•	•		•	•	•	•	•		•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	80%
Have a MOU with local health agencies and other key partners in the community		•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•		•		•	•		•	75%
Practice/train for emergency plans	•		•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•				75%
Educate and train students, faculty, and staff about mass notification system, and their roles and responsibilities in an emergency				•	•	•	•	•		•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		70%
Educate faculty, staff, and students about recognizing and responding to signs of mental illness and other potential threats				•		•		•	•	•		•	•		•	•	•	•	•		60%
Conduct risk and safety assessments	•		•	•	•	•	•		•	•			•			•		•		•	60%
Have an interoperable communication system with all area responders	•		•	•	•	•				•		•		•		•	•			•	55%
Ensure that all responder agencies are trained in National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS)	•				•	•		•				•	•			•	•	•		•	50%
Regularly evaluate/update emergency plans				•		•	•			•	•	•	•				•	•			45%
Provide on-campus counseling and case workers						•		•	•	•			•				•	•	•		40%
Maintain full compliance with Clery Act	•	•			•		•		•	•								•		•	40%
Install cameras/CCTV at building entrances/ exits and other critical areas on campus				•	•		•	•		•	•			•							35%
Create a culture of shared responsibility for campus safety		•		•									•		•		•		•	•	35%
Get public safety agency accredited through CALEA and/or IACLEA	•	•		•	•			•	•								•				35%
Establish protocol for identifying & responding to students who may pose potential threat				•					•							•	•	•		•	30%

Recommendations	AG's	COPS	Exp.	FL	IACLEA	IL	KY	MO	NJ	NM	NSU	NC	OK	PA	Rep. Pres.	U. of CA	U. of NC	VA Tech Panel	VA Work Grp	WI	
Address alcohol & drug abuse and other major issues on campus				•			•	•					•				•			•	30%
Designate single point of contact for external communication during/after emergency			•	•				•								•			•	•	30%
Attempt to eliminate financial, cultural, and logistical barriers to students receiving mental health treatment (e.g., sufficient staff, insurance, etc.)						•			•				•		•		•			•	30%
Utilize Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)				•				•		•							•			•	25%
Develop and keep updated policy on bringing weapons on campus	•		•		•	•												•			25%
Install locking systems in all buildings, offices and classrooms							•	•		•	•			•							25%
Conduct regularly scheduled table top exercises				•			•			•	•						•				25%
Regularly test mass notification system									•	•		•				•	•				25%
Secure buildings with keyless locking devices (such as automated cards) that can be controlled remotely				•	•		•			•				•							25%
Provide services for victims and/or families of victims			•		•		•					•						•			25%
Maintain up-to-date emergency contact information for students and/or employees	•					•	•						•			•					25%
Develop an "active shooter" response plan and provide training for police				•					•							•		•			20%
Train mental health personnel and first responders on requirements for involuntary hospitalization, treatment, and withdrawal					•	•											•	•			20%
Ensure all physical safety mechanisms (locks, etc.), emergency call-boxes, and emergency lights are functional				•	•					•	•										20%
Establish a hotline or some other mechanism for anonymous reporting	•										•				•					•	20%
Conduct criminal background checks for faculty, staff, and/or students					•										•		•				15%
Develop contingency plans for loss of power, telecommunications, and relocation									•					•						•	15%
Establish an Emergency Operations Center			•								•							•			15%
Ensure that campus is well-lit and/or provide emergency lighting							•	•			•										15%
Ensure that all outside first responders have campus maps				•										•							10%

Recommendations	AG's	COPS	Exp.	FL	IACLEA	IL	KY	MO	NJ	NM	NSU	NC	OK	PA	Rep. Pres.	U. of CA	U. of NC	VA Tech Panel	VA Work Grp	WI	
Develop messages to de-stigmatize mental illness						•			•												10%
Use International Association of Counseling Services (IACS) guidelines for best practices in mental health services						•			•												10%
Purchase satellite phones							•				•										10%
Create campus safety resource/info website								•									•				10%
Provide EMT/ first-responder/ crisis intervention training for campus safety officers				•	•																10%
Have campus police/security provide information about safety and mental health services during orientation									•					•							10%
Equip classrooms with locking devices allowing them to be secured from within								•						•							10%
Establish system to track and communicate with campus members who disperse during an emergency																	•				5%
Expand opportunities for incoming students to integrate into campus community						•															5%
Place campus on lockdown in the event of threatening conduct on or adjacent to campus											•										5%
Equip all classrooms with telephones and/or panic buttons											•										5%
Encourage all incoming students livingin residence halls to consent to periodic searches and seizures											•										5%
Ensure that all entrance/exit gates are manned 24 hours a day											•										5%
Prepare mass notification messages in advance for all identified potential threats														•							5%
Inform students and employees on locations of safe areas for waiting out emergency														•							5%
Add "Intro to Mental Health" course to undergraduate curriculum				•																	5%
Have employee assistance programs													•								5%
Maintain photographs of all students													•								5%
Institute program to end violence against women					•																5%

Sources:

AG's: Report and Recommendations of Task Force on School and Campus Safety, National Association of Attorneys General, 2007.

COPS: *National Summit on Campus Public Safety: Strategies for Colleges and Universities in a Homeland Security Environment*; COPS, 2005.

Exp: *Expecting the Unexpected: Lessons from the Virginia Tech Tragedy*; American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2007.

FL: *Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety*, State of Florida, 2007.

IACLEA: *Overview of the Virginia Tech Tragedy and Implications for Campus Safety: The IACLEA Blueprint for Safer Campuses*; The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2008.

IL: *State of Illinois Campus Security Task Force Report to the Governor*, 2008.

KY: *Report to the Governor: Examination of Safety and Security at Kentucky's Public and Private Postsecondary Institutions*; Governor's Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007.

MO: *Securing our Future: Making Colleges and Universities Safe Places to Learn and Grow*; Missouri Campus Security Task Force, 2007.

NJ: *New Jersey Campus Security Task Force Report Submitted to Governor Jon S. Corzine*, 2007.

NM: (1) *Recommendations for Action: Emergency Preparedness in Higher Education*; New Mexico Governor's Task Force on Campus Safety, 2007; (2) Final Report, Subcommittee on Mitigation, Protocols, and Infrastructure, New Mexico Governor's Task Force on Campus Safety, 2008.

NSU: *Campus Safety and Security Task Force Final Report*, Norfolk State University, 2007.

NC: *Report to the Campus Safety Task Force Presented to Attorney General Roy Cooper*, North Carolina, 2008.

OK: Campus Life and Safety and Security Task Force (CLASS) Final Report, Oklahoma, 2008.

PA: *Pennsylvania College Campus Security Assessment Report*; Pennsylvania State Police, 2007.

Rep. to Pres.: *Report to the President: On Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy*; Leavitt, Gonzales, & Spellings, 2007.

U. of CA: *The Report of the University of California Campus Security Task Force*; University of California Office of the President, 2008.

U. of NC: *The University of North Carolina Campus Safety Task Force Report to the President,* 2007.

VA Tech Panel: *Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech*, Report of the Review Panel Presented to Governor Kaine, Commonwealth of Virginia, 2007.

VA Work Grp: Findings and Recommendations of the Virginia Working Group for Virginia Tech President Charles Steger, 2007.

WI: *Governor's Task Force on Campus Safety*, Wisconsin, 2007

Note: While every attempt was made to capture and reflect accurately the recommendations contained in the referenced reports, no claim or guarantee is made or inferred that this list is all inclusive. Please refer to the individual reports for a complete list.

APPENDIX C

RECOMMENDED ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION TOPICS

RECOMMENDED ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION TOPICS

Unlike many corporate environments with top-down paths of authority, colleges and universities are typically organized as democracies in which the faculty and other stakeholders play significant roles in the governance process and decision-making on a wide range of policy matters, academic and otherwise. While members of a college community will concur about the overriding objective of keeping campuses safe, there will likely be sharp disagreements over the appropriate means toward this end. We expect that certain recommendations advanced in this report will, for the most part, be readily embraced without dissent. A few, on the other hand, are fairly controversial and should stir considerable debate.

In this section, we highlight those areas that merit discussion involving a wide range of campus constituencies, including faculty, administrators, student services professionals, police officials, and legal counsel. We urge a full and open discourse on their relevance and advisability for a particular campus environment. While our team has made recommendations related to many of these issues, based upon research and experience with violence prevention, implementation is more complex and requires campus-wide input. For example, although we recommend that schools should install CCTV, siting and application on any given campus requires considerable discussion. Other issues, such as the use of interior door locks, involve too many variables for us to advance a blanket recommendation.

1. **Discussion Topic: How can psychiatric services be better provided to support the distributed campuses?**

2. **Discussion Topic: How can campus mental health services be expanded or improved?**

3. **Discussion Topic: What should be the arming policy for sworn police officers on campus?**

4. **Discussion Topic: What is the best strategy for employing CCTV cameras throughout campus?**

5. **Discussion Topic: What should be the policy pertaining to faculty and staff concerns about a student or colleague who demonstrates the potential for violence?**

6. **Discussion Topics: What should be the policy for background checks on students (criminal records, mental health issues, and disciplinary actions)?**

7. Discussion Topic: How should colleges solicit anonymous tips, how should the information be handled, and what steps can be taken to guard against malicious abuse of the system?

8. Discussion Topic: What should the roles and responsibilities of key campus personnel be in the event of a crisis?

9. Discussion Topic: Should classrooms be equipped with interior locking devices?

10. Discussion Topic: What protections should there be to ensure that a college's attempt to identify at-risk individuals does not stifle free individual expression and diversity?

APPENDIX D

SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESULTS

Part 1. Campus Characterization

1. Which of the following best describes your campus environment?

		Count	Percent
Inner-City		7	28%
Urban		7	28%
Suburban		7	28%
Semi-Rural		3	12%
Rural		1	4%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

2. How many buildings are located within the campus? Select the closest range.

		Count	Percent
1-5		2	8%
6-9		9	36%
10-19		6	24%
20-29		5	20%
30 or more		3	12%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

3. Does your campus contain leased buildings or facilities?

		Count	Percent
Yes		13	54%
No		11	46%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

4. If you answered yes to No. 3 above, select the range that is closest to the number of leased buildings on your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-5		13	100%
6-9		0	0%
10-19		0	0%
20-29		0	0%
30 or more		0	0%
	Total	13	
	NA/Skip	12	

5. What is the total land area in acres of the entire campus? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-10		1	4%
11-24		3	13%
25 or more		20	83%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

6. What is the approximate total square footage of academic and administrative facilities excluding student housing? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
50K - 99,999		0	0%
100K - 249,999		1	5%
250K - 499,999		9	41%
500K - 1M		10	46%
More than 1M		2	9%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

7. What is the approximate total square footage of student housing facilities owned and operated by the institution? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
10K - 24,999		1	14%
25K - 50K		1	14%
More than 50K		5	71%
	Total	7	
	NA/Skip	18	

8. What is the total student population (undergraduate and graduate combined)? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1 - 499		0	0%
500 - 999		0	0%
1,000 - 2,499		5	21%
2,500 - 5,000		4	17%
More than 5,000		15	63%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

9. What is the total faculty and staff population excluding safety, fire department and security personnel?[2] Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-24		0	0%
25-49		0	0%
50-99		0	0%
100-200		0	0%
More than 200		24	100%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

10. What is the total police/security and safety staff population? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-9		6	24%
10-24		13	52%
25-50		4	16%
More than 50		2	8%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

11. Does your campus have a dedicated security or police command center facility?

		Count	Percent
Yes		19	76%
No		6	24%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

12. Does your campus have a fire department/EMS facility on site?

		Count	Percent
Yes		0	0%
No		25	100%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

[2] Throughout the survey, we use the terms "police" and "security" interchangeably. In the report, however, we rightly distinguish between campus police officers and security officers. We strongly recommend that anyone who uses this survey instrument in the future make this distinction within the survey.

13. If you answered yes to No. 12 above, what is the total population of the fire department? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-9		0	0%
10-24		0	0%
25-50		0	0%
More than 50		0	0%
	Total	0	
	NA/Skip	25	

Part 2: Prevention and Early Detection

14. Do your campus residential staff receive mental health training?

		Count	Percent
Yes		10	77%
No		3	23%
	Total	13	
	NA/Skip	12	

15. Do student affairs personnel receive mental health training?

		Count	Percent
Yes		11	48%
No		12	52%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

16. Do student health staff receive mental health training?

		Count	Percent
Yes		16	80%
No		4	20%
	Total	20	
	NA/Skip	5	

17. Does the faculty receive mental health training?

		Count	Percent
Yes		5	22%
No		18	78%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

18. Does your campus have an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for faculty and staff?

		Count	Percent
Yes		25	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

19. Does your campus have an EAP for graduate assistants?

		Count	Percent
Yes		3	20%
No		12	80%
	Total	15	
	NA/Skip	10	

20. Does your campus have an EAP for contract workers?

		Count	Percent
Yes		10	53%
No		9	47%
	Total	19	
	NA/Skip	6	

21. If you answered yes to No. 18, 19, or 20 above, is there a documented protocol for referrals to the EAP?

		Count	Percent
Yes		16	76%
No		5	24%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

22. Are there on-campus mental health services available to students?

		Count	Percent
Yes		20	83%
No		4	17%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

23. Are there on-campus mental health services available to faculty/staff?

		Count	Percent
Yes		9	38%
No		15	63%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

24. If you answered yes to No. 22 and/or 23 above, do you provide specialized services (e.g., substance abuse, suicide prevention, eating disorders, etc.), or just generalized mental health services?

		Count	Percent
Specialized services		12	57%
Only generalized services		9	43%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

25. Is there a student-in-need referral program?

		Count	Percent
Yes		21	91%
No		2	9%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

26. Are mental health counselors able to see students immediately (i.e., same day) on an urgent/crisis basis?

		Count	Percent
Yes		18	82%
No		4	18%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

27. If you answered yes to No. 26 above, how many urgent cases were seen in calendar year 2007? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
Less than 10		4	25%
11-24		8	50%
25-50		1	6%
More than 50		3	19%
	Total	16	
	NA/Skip	9	

28. After an initial urgent/crisis counseling session, what is the average waiting period (# of days) before a student is scheduled for regular counseling sessions during peak usage periods (e.g., final exams)? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
Less than 5		16	89%
5-9		2	11%
10-14		0	0%
More than 2 weeks		0	0%
	Total	18	
	NA/Skip	7	

29. In general, what is the current waiting period (# of days) for non-emergency appointments to your counseling center? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
Less than 5		13	68%
5-9		3	16%
10-14		3	16%
More than 2 weeks		0	0%
	Total	19	
	NA/Skip	6	

30. Do you have a psychiatrist on staff or readily available?

		Count	Percent
Yes		5	23%
No		17	77%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

31. If you answered yes to No. 30 above, how many psychiatrists provide primary treatment, counseling, and related mental health services to students?

	Count	Percent
Total	5	20%
NA/Skip	20	80%
Mean = 1.2		

32. How many psychologists provide primary treatment, counseling, and related mental health services to students?

	Count	Percent
Total	14	56%
NA/Skip	11	44%
Mean = 0.8		

33. How many social workers provide primary treatment, counseling, and related mental health services to students?

	Count	Percent
Total	16	64%
NA/Skip	9	36%
Mean = 1.4		

34. Is your counseling center accredited?

		Count	Percent
Yes		2	10%
No		19	91%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

35. What is your current student to counseling staff ratio? Fill in the blank: ______ to 1

	Count	Percent
Total	19	76%
NA/Skip	6	24%
Mean = 1986		

36. Do you provide mental health services to students outside of regular weekday business hours – i.e., evenings and weekends?

		Count	Percent
Yes		6	27%
No		16	73%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

37. If you answered yes to No. 36 above, are those services on-campus or off-campus (i.e., community-based)?

		Count	Percent
On-campus		6	100%
Community-based		0	0%
	Total	6	
	NA/Skip	19	

38. Does the university/college provide follow-up services to students outside of scheduled counseling services?

		Count	Percent
Yes		13	62%
No		8	38%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

Part 3: Prevention and Early Detection, continued

39. Has your university/college seen an increase in students with severe psychological problems in recent years?

		Count	Percent
Yes		21	91%
No		2	9%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

40. How many students reportedly attempted suicide in calendar year 2007?

	Count	Percent
Total	19	76%
NA/Skip	6	24%
Mean = 2.6		

41. How many students committed suicide in calendar year 2007?

	Count	Percent
Total	20	80%
NA/Skip	5	20%
Mean = 0.1		

42. Does the student health center and/or counseling center use a standardized evidence-based mental health assessment tool?

		Count	Percent
Yes		7	35%
No		13	65%
	Total	20	
	NA/Skip	5	

43. Once a student is identified as a risk by the student health or counseling center, is there a mechanism in place to assess the level of risk and urgency for referral to expert mental health professionals?

		Count	Percent
Yes		19	91%
No		2	10%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

44. Does your college/university submit potentially violent writings, drawings and other forms of individual expression to a forensic behavioral science expert for review?

		Count	Percent
Yes		4	19%
No		17	81%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

45. Once an assessment is completed, is there a documented protocol for providing confidential or privileged information to university/college authorities?

		Count	Percent
Yes		12	57%
No		9	43%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

46. Does your university/college financially support peer-to-peer student support organizations that are dedicated to the mental health of college students?

		Count	Percent
Yes		3	14%
No		19	86%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

47. Does anyone at your institution have a detailed understanding of HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)?

		Count	Percent
Yes		21	96%
No		1	5%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

48. Does anyone at your institution have a detailed understanding of FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act)?

		Count	Percent
Yes		23	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

Part 4: Security and Safety Technology

49. Does your campus utilize a campus-wide master key system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		20	83%
No		4	17%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

50. Are classroom and office doors equipped with interior locking devices?

		Count	Percent
Yes		7	30%
No		16	70%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

51. Are exterior doors on campus in need of repair or replacement?

		Count	Percent
Yes		14	58%
No		10	42%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

52. Are all exterior doors on dorms able to be closed and locked?

		Count	Percent
Yes		10	91%
No		1	9%
	Total	11	
	NA/Skip	14	

53. Have lever bar action door latches (which can be chained together) been replaced?

		Count	Percent
Yes		9	39%
No		14	61%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

54. Does your campus utilize an automated key management system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		9	38%
No		15	63%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

55. Does your campus use a universal ID card system for students, faculty and staff?

		Count	Percent
Yes		16	67%
No		8	33%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

56. Does your campus utilize a campus-wide physical access control system? (e.g., a system whereby exterior doors can be locked remotely.)

		Count	Percent
Yes		6	25%
No		18	75%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

57. Does your campus utilize a campus-wide CCTV system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		11	46%
No		13	54%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

58. If you answered yes to No. 57 above, approximately how many CCTV cameras are deployed on your campus? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-24		4	31%
25-49		6	46%
50-100		2	15%
More than 100		1	8%
	Total	13	
	NA/Skip	12	

Part 5: Security and Safety Technology, continued

59. Are there emergency call stations (Code Blue or similar) deployed at your campus?

		Count	Percent
Yes		20	80%
No		5	20%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

60. If you answered yes to No. 59 above, approximately how many emergency call stations are deployed on your campus? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-9		4	21%
10-20		8	42%
More than 20		7	37%
	Total	19	
	NA/Skip	6	

61. Do your classrooms, lecture halls or laboratories have emergency signaling capability (e.g., emergency call stations, intercom stations or assistance stations)?

		Count	Percent
Yes		6	24%
No		19	76%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

62. If you answered yes to No. 61 above, approximately how many emergency signaling devices are deployed on your campus? Choose the range that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
1-9		1	17%
10-50		1	17%
More than 50		4	67%
	Total	6	
	NA/Skip	19	

63. If you answered yes to No. 61 above, where are emergency or intercom signals announced? Choose the answer that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
At One Command Center		3	43%
At Each Building		0	0%
At Various Locations		4	57%
	Total	7	
	NA/Skip	18	

64. Does your campus utilize a campus-wide radio communication system (e.g., portable radios, base stations or vehicle mounted mobile radios)?

		Count	Percent
Yes		23	96%
No		1	4%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

65. If you answered yes to No. 64 above, are your radio communications interoperable between Security and Fire/Rescue personnel?

		Count	Percent
Yes		12	57%
No		9	43%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

66. If you answered yes to No. 64 above, are your radio communications interoperable between Security and local Police Department personnel?

		Count	Percent
Yes		13	59%
No		9	41%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

67. If you answered yes to No. 64 above, are your radio communications interoperable between Security and Federal Law Enforcement or Emergency Management personnel?

		Count	Percent
Yes		7	33%
No		14	67%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

Part 6: Campus Security Department

68. Are security officers trained in emergency first aid and CPR?

		Count	Percent
Yes		25	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

69. Are any of your security officers sworn police officers?

		Count	Percent
Yes		20	80%
No		5	20%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

70. If you answered yes to No. 69 above, what is the total number of sworn police officers in your security department?

	Count	Percent
Total	20	80%
NA/Skip	5	20%
Mean = 15.7		

71. What is the total number of officers (including both sworn and non-sworn) in your security department?

	Count	Percent
Total	23	92%
NA/Skip	2	8%
Mean = 18.3		

72. Do security officers carry firearms?

		Count	Percent
Yes		8	32%
No		17	68%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

73. Do security officers carry "less than lethal" weapons?

		Count	Percent
Yes		21	84%
No		4	16%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

74. Do security officers have the equipment required to forcibly enter a locked building or room?

		Count	Percent
Yes		5	20%
No		20	80%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

75. Are security offcers given mental health training?

		Count	Percent
Yes		12	48%
No		13	52%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

76. Are security officers trained on active shooter reponse tactics?

		Count	Percent
Yes		13	52%
No		12	48%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

77. If you answered yes to No. 76 above, are students involved in the drills?

		Count	Percent
Yes		0	0%
No		15	100%
	Total	15	
	NA/Skip	10	

78. Has your institution conducted any school shooter drills?

		Count	Percent
Yes		9	36%
No		16	64%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

79. Is public safety part of the student orientation process?

		Count	Percent
Yes		20	80%
No		5	20%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

80. Does your institution have an anonymous tip hotline?

		Count	Percent
Yes		9	36%
No		16	64%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

81. Has your institution conducted a vulnerability assessment?

		Count	Percent
Yes		3	12%
No		22	88%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

82. If you answered yes to No. 81 above, how long ago was the vulnerability assessment conducted? Choose the answer that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
Within the last 6 months		1	33%
Within the last year		1	33%
Within the last 2 years		1	33%
Within the last 5 years		0	0%
More than 5 years ago		0	0%
	Total	3	
	NA/Skip	22	

Part 7: Mass Notification Technology

83. Does your campus have mass notification technology? (If your answer is No, please skip to the next page of the survey).

		Count	Percent
Yes		25	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

84. Does your campus have a wide area paging system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		9	38%
No		15	63%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

85. Does your campus have a wide area siren system such as used for civil defense or storm emergency warnings?

		Count	Percent
Yes		1	4%
No		23	96%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

86. Does your campus have an e-mail emergency notification system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		24	96%
No		1	4%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

87. Does your campus have an emergency text message broadcast system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		23	92%
No		2	8%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

88. Does your campus have an automated telephone message broadcast system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		24	96%
No		1	4%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

89. Has your mass notification system ever been used before (either in an actual emergency or as an exercise)?

		Count	Percent
Yes		19	76%
No		6	24%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

90. Does the mass notification system for faculty/staff differ from that for students?

		Count	Percent
Yes		3	12%
No		22	88%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

91. Is there a formal policy for use of the emergency notification system?

		Count	Percent
Yes		17	68%
No		8	32%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

Part 8: Campus Policies

92. Does the school administration have a system for screening student applicants (i.e., pre-entry screening) to obtain appropriate special education, disciplinary, criminal, and mental health records?

		Count	Percent
Yes		8	36%
No		14	64%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

93. Does your school have a policy regarding what staff/ faculty should do if they have a concern about a student or colleague who appears to have the potential for becoming violent?

		Count	Percent
Yes		15	68%
No		7	32%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

94. If you answered yes to No. 93 above, please describe what this policy entails.

		Count	Percent
	Total	16	64%
	NA/Skip	9	36%

95. Have staff and faculty been specifically trained to recognize risk factors for students/ employees who may pose a risk of violence?

		Count	Percent
Yes		7	30%
No		16	70%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

96. Does your college/university have a policy regarding evaluations of students/employees who have been identified by faculty/staff as needing a mental health evaluation?

		Count	Percent
Yes		8	36%
No		14	64%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

97. If you answered yes to No. 96 above, please describe the policy.

		Count	Percent
	Total	8	32%
	NA/Skip	17	68%

98. Is there a policy regarding how to handle a student who refuses a voluntary evaluation?

		Count	Percent
Yes		11	48%
No		12	52%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

99. If you answered yes to No. 98 above, please describe the policy.

		Count	Percent
	Total	11	44%
	NA/Skip	14	56%

100. Do you have a program for training particular faculty, staff and students for special responsibility in security awareness and procedures (passing on critical information, securing the classroom, acting as fire wardens, etc.) in response to crises?

		Count	Percent
Yes		10	44%
No		13	57%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

Part 9: Campus Policies, continued

101. Does the campus police department or security force have an "Active Shooter" plan?

		Count	Percent
Yes		16	64%
No		9	36%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

102. Does the police department or security force regularly conduct practical training exercises for response to an active shooter (and other disturbances) on campus?

		Count	Percent
Yes		13	52%
No		12	48%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

103. If you answered yes to No. 102 above, how often are these exercises conducted? Choose the answer that most closely matches your campus.

		Count	Percent
Monthly		0	0%
A few times a year		4	31%
Annually		8	62%
Less often than once a year		1	8%
	Total	13	
	NA/Skip	12	

104. Is there a mutual aid agreement with neighboring public safety services and joint training efforts with them?

		Count	Percent
Yes		16	67%
No		8	33%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

105. Is there a Student Code of Conduct and a judicial function in place to deal with code violations?

		Count	Percent
Yes		25	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

106. Have you been in touch with Homeland Security and similar state agencies to determine resources available for planning, training and assistance during crises?

		Count	Percent
Yes		19	76%
No		6	24%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

107. Do you have a policy regarding Clery Act Compliance?

		Count	Percent
Yes		25	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

108. Do you have a policy to deal with bringing weapons onto campus?

		Count	Percent
Yes		25	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	25	
	NA/Skip	0	

109. Do you have a procedure and physical method to secure (lockdown) buildings that are vulnerable to attack?

		Count	Percent
Yes		7	29%
No		17	71%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

110. In warning of a violent act committed on campus, is it your policy to specify what has taken place?

		Count	Percent
Yes		17	71%
No		7	29%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

Part 10: Threat Assessment and Response

111. In the event of a critical incident, does your college/university have a written Emergency Response Plan?

		Count	Percent
Yes		24	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	24	
	NA/Skip	1	

112. If you answered yes to No. 111 above, does the plan describe a Threat Assessment Team (TAT), the positions and functions?

		Count	Percent
Yes		15	65%
No		8	35%
	Total	23	
	NA/Skip	2	

113. If your school does not have a TAT plan, proceed to the next page of the survey. Does the school policy define and give examples of dangerous behaviors to be reported to the TAT? (The remaining questions all pertain to the TAT.)

		Count	Percent
Yes		10	71%
No		4	29%
	Total	14	
	NA/Skip	11	

114. Who comprises the TAT? (Check all that apply)

		Count	Percent
School Administration		16	94%
Mental Health		12	71%
Legal Representatives		2	12%
Law Enforcement Representatives		14	82%
Others		12	71%
	Total	17	
	NA/Skip	8	

115. Does the TAT plan emphasize sharing information among university personnel and team participants?

		Count	Percent
Yes		15	94%
No		1	6%
	Total	16	
	NA/Skip	9	

116. Does the TAT plan define the roles and duties of each TAT participant?

		Count	Percent
Yes		10	63%
No		6	38%
	Total	16	
	NA/Skip	9	

117. Is there an attorney on the TAT to discuss privacy and confidentiality issues, and to facilitate obtaining judicial injunctions, Temporary Restraining Orders, and assist in preparing legal documents to deal with potentially dangerous situations?

		Count	Percent
Yes		4	25%
No		12	75%
	Total	16	
	NA/Skip	9	

118. Does the mental health representative of the TAT have prearranged plans for the evaluation and hospitalization of students/employees who may pose a danger to themselves or other persons?

		Count	Percent
Yes		9	75%
No		3	25%
	Total	12	
	NA/Skip	13	

119. Does the TAT plan allow for the immediate removal from the population of potentially dangerous persons?

		Count	Percent
Yes		14	88%
No		2	13%
	Total	16	
	NA/Skip	9	

120. Does the TAT plan outline a system that can be used by faculty, staff, students and visitors to report incidents?

		Count	Percent
Yes		13	81%
No		3	19%
	Total	16	
	NA/Skip	9	

Part 11: Threat Assessment and Response, continued

121. The next several questions refer to your school's Emergency Response Plan. If you do not have an ERP, proceed to Question No. 126. How often is the ERP reviewed for changes in conditions, personnel and positions? Choose the answer that most closely matches your current policy.

		Count	Percent
Quarterly		3	14%
Semi-Annually		3	14%
Annually		12	55%
Less than once a year		4	18%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

122. When was the ERP last updated? Choose the answer that best matches your campus.

	Count	Percent
Within the last 6 months	14	61%
Within the last year	7	30%
Within the last 5 years	2	9%
More than 5 years ago	0	0%
Total	23	
NA/Skip	2	

123. Do all individuals with a role to play in the ERP have access to the plan (written copies, on-line, etc.)?

	Count	Percent
Yes	22	96%
No	1	4%
Total	23	
NA/Skip	2	

124. Does the ERP include easily accessible emergency telephone numbers of the appropriate persons to notify in the event of crises?

	Count	Percent
Yes	21	91%
No	2	9%
Total	23	
NA/Skip	2	

125. Does the ERP outline a notification system (with backup plans) for alerting the campus to danger or announcing other vital information?

	Count	Percent
Yes	15	65%
No	8	35%
Total	23	
NA/Skip	2	

126. Does your school have an organized, trained behavioral health trauma response team?

	Count	Percent
Yes	8	35%
No	15	65%
Total	23	
NA/Skip	2	

127. If you answered yes to No. 126 above, does the team meet on a periodic basis to role play scenarios or conduct table top exercises?

		Count	Percent
Yes		4	50%
No		4	50%
	Total	8	
	NA/Skip	17	

128. If you answered yes to No. 126 above, is the team on-campus or off-campus?

		Count	Percent
On-campus		5	71%
Off-campus		2	29%
	Total	7	
	NA/Skip	18	

129. If you answered yes to No. 126 above and the team is on-campus, has the team been trained by a recognized trauma response team?

		Count	Percent
Yes		4	67%
No		2	33%
	Total	6	
	NA/Skip	19	

130. If you answered yes to No. 126 above and are using an off-campus team, has that team been fully oriented to the culture & resources of the college/ university?

		Count	Percent
Yes		1	33%
No		2	67%
	Total	3	
	NA/Skip	22	

131. If you answered yes to No. 126 above, are members of the behavioral health response team trained to understand cultural concerns as they relate to reacting to trauma?

		Count	Percent
Yes		5	100%
No		0	0%
	Total	5	
	NA/Skip	20	

132. Does your campus have an emergency medical services (EMS) response capability?

		Count	Percent
Yes		13	59%
No		9	41%
	Total	22	
	NA/Skip	3	

133. Is there a mutual aid agreement with neighboring medical response services and joint training efforts with them?

		Count	Percent
Yes		11	52%
No		10	48%
	Total	21	
	NA/Skip	4	

APPENDIX E

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLES FROM RESEARCH TEAM

The Chronicle of
Higher Education

February 29, 2008

Commentary: The Contagion of Campus Bloodshed

By JAMES ALAN FOX

The gun smoke had barely cleared from the lecture hall at Northern Illinois University where last week a former graduate student had executed five students before killing himself when local and national scribes began speculating about a new trend in mass murder American style. The Chicago Tribune Web site, quick with coverage of the tragedy some 75 miles away in DeKalb, noted that the shooting spree was the largest on a college campus since the Virginia Tech massacre. Meanwhile, the Associated Press disseminated a list of more than a dozen campus shootings occurring since 2000.

Are college students indeed the latest mark for heavily armed avengers? The 1980s witnessed a string of shootings by disgruntled postal workers, inspiring the term "going postal." The '90s featured a flurry of multiple murders at middle and high schools nationwide, as "Doing a Columbine" became shorthand for a schoolyard threat. Will this decade be remembered as the time when the ever-popular "College Survival Guides" shifted focus from tips on how to study for a midterm to advice on where safely to sit while taking the midterm?

Epidemic thinking can tragically become a self-fulfilling prophesy by fueling a contagion of bloodshed. The over-publicized acts of two alienated students at Columbine High in part inspired the Virginia Tech shooter to outperform his younger heroes. As the death toll rose that fateful Monday morning last spring in Blacksburg, on-air news anchors tracked the unfolding drama as ignominious records began to tumble. Shortly after announcing that the shooting had become the largest campus massacre ever, eclipsing the 1966 Texas Tower sniping, television commentators declared, with nearly gleeful enthusiasm, that it had surpassed in carnage all other mass shootings in the United States at any venue. For the remainder of the day, viewers were told repeatedly that the Virginia Tech massacre had been the biggest, the bloodiest, the absolute worst, the most devastating, or whatever other superlatives came to mind. Notwithstanding the cruel absurdity of treating human suffering as any sort of achievement worthy of measuring in such terms, little positive can be derived by highlighting such records. But there is one significant negative: Records exist but to be broken.

Unquestionably, the overwhelming majority of Americans who watched the news about Virginia Tech or Northern Illinois would have identified with the pain and suffering of the victims, their families, and the entire campus communities. However, a few would instead have

identified with the power of the perpetrators. Imagine, for example, the reaction of some disgruntled student watching one network's newscast last week in which a computer simulation was shown of the gunman at Northern Illinois blasting away at a classroom of students.

The source of contagion extends well beyond the mass media, however, landing right at the steps of college campuses everywhere. In the wake of recent high-profile tragedies, college administrators have made campus safety and security a priority. Not only are colleges feeling compelled to divert scarce resources away from important academic needs over to security technology, but an overemphasis on protecting the campus from active shooters can do more harm than good.

Extended dialogue with students and their parents about safety rather than scholastics as well as efforts to transform open campuses into locked fortresses send two perilous messages. Not only do they advance the overblown image of students as walking targets, thereby reinforcing rather than calming fears, but they may also challenge a few to prove themselves powerful and invincible.

At the same time, efforts to upgrade security beyond what is reasonable based on the limited risk would hardly provide a pleasant campus climate. What student wants to attend classes in an armed camp?

It is reasonable, of course, for colleges to develop contingency plans and seek sensible ways to ensure a safe campus. But as with any tragedy like the ones at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois, our society often embraces and even demands extreme responses to extreme and aberrational behavior. Such actions, in hindsight, aren't always prudent.

Consider the measures that many colleges and universities are taking to avoid becoming the next Virginia Tech or Northern Illinois. Though sounding good, they are not necessarily sound.

Safety first: Admissions counselors are quick these days to point out safety features of their campuses. For students and their parents, choosing the right college may depend on balancing security and scholarship. Still, the smart strategy is to focus on the traditional selection criteria — academic quality, range of majors and social life rather than simply security. For if safety becomes the top priority, then the only choice may be an online degree or no college at all.

Lockdown: This is the new catchphrase on campus security, often raised in parental inquiries about safety procedures. Leaving aside the impossibility of truly locking down a sprawling campus, most college shootings take place in one location. Plus, shooting sprees typically end so quickly that locking down students in dorms and classrooms and turning away off-campus students wouldn't help.

Security guards: Beefing up the campus security force can have a short-term impact by making students feel safer, particularly in the wake of a widely publicized college shooting. But in the longer term, what will universities do to pay for the additional security? Raise tuition? Cut back on faculty? Reduce the number of classes?

Profiling students: In the aftermath of a shooting, we inevitably search for clues that may have alerted the campus to a student who was profoundly suicidal and bent on revenge. Yet, predicting rare events, such as a campus shooting, is virtually impossible. Thousands of college students exhibit warning signs yellow flags that only turn red after the blood spills. Over-aggressiveness in trying to identify and coerce a troubled and belligerent student into treatment can potentially intensify feelings of persecution and precipitate the very violent act that we're attempting to avert. Moreover, as with the shooter at Northern Illinois, the warning signs are not necessarily obvious, if even present.

Right to carry: As many as a dozen states are considering proposals that would permit properly licensed students, faculty members, and administrators to carry concealed firearms on campus. Supporters argue that the death toll at Virginia Tech, for example, might have been lower had students other than the gunman been armed. There is no telling, of course, whether more lives would have been lost in uncontrolled crossfire, or whether more episodes of gun violence would result. Still, at least one Nevada college, a campus where many students own guns for sport, has been considering a plan to train the faculty to shoot. For faculty members, however, marksmanship should be a matter of A's and B's, not guns and ammo.

Of course, if the risk of campus bloodshed were indeed significant, then "playing it safe" would be the wise approach. Notwithstanding recent episodes, for the 18 million college students in America, the odds of being murdered on campus are so low one might need a course in college math to calibrate them.

From 2001 through 2005, 76 homicides were reported at American colleges, based on a database of incidents assembled from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Education, and various news sources. Leaving aside cases involving faculty members, staff members, and other nonstudents as victims, the count of undergraduate and graduate students murdered at school numbered fewer than 10 per year, on average. When compared with virtually any metropolitan area, a student's chance of falling victim actually decreases once he or she steps on campus. Most reported cases of campus homicide, moreover, involved interpersonal disputes among friends and acquaintances or drug deals gone awry, not the unprecipitated act of a vengeful sniper.

Ironically, heightened levels of fear, despite being out of proportion with reality, can sometimes motivate important and long overdue changes that have wide-ranging impact. The Postal Service, for example, was pressured by its bloodstained image to upgrade its approach to employee relations and grievance handling. The Columbine era forced public schools finally to take seriously the widespread and insidious problem of schoolyard bullying.

The renewed focus surrounding mental health services, student "centeredness," and ensuring that faculty members do not abuse their power over the lives and careers of students (and graduate students in particular) are reasonable and responsible areas for change. Whether these improvements will prevent future episodes of campus bloodshed remains questionable; but they will likely enhance the wellbeing of millions of college students across America.

Finally, what about the ongoing contagion of campus bloodshed that seems to many Americans to be out of control? Like other so-called epidemics of decades gone by, this latest surge should eventually run its course" that is, unless we nourish it through anxiety, panic, and hyperbole.

James Alan Fox is a professor of criminal justice and of law, policy, and society at Northeastern University in Boston. He is working with Applied Risk Management on an assessment of campus violence prevention strategies for the Massachusetts Board of Higher Education.

To Dream, Perchance to Kill

By Roger L. Depue and Joanne M. Depue

Albert Einstein said that "thought is father of the action." This axiom is directly applicable to violence in schools and offices, and an understanding of its implications may help managers detect the early warning signs of a troubled employee. Einstein referred particularly to the sequence of thoughts known as personal fantasies that affect our everyday behavior. These fantasies form an integral part of our self-management-systems mechanisms. Through them we face our flaws, process our emotions, seek solutions for difficult situations, and dream of becoming "better" human beings. In daydreams we console and entertain ourselves, create agendas, and rehearse possible actions. Security professionals, teachers, and others who acquaint themselves with the nature of personal reveries can watch for external signs of abnormal fantasies that are the precursors to destructive behavior. By doing so, they can stop these "crimes in process" before they become reality.

Nature of fantasies. Fantasies are thought processes: internal monologues and imaginative sequences incorporating personal needs, values, and defenses. Every human being, across cultures, has significant psychosocial needs that crave satisfaction. Examples include control, self-esteem, autonomy, dependency, nurturance, affiliation, and sex. There are also innate universal economic, social, and spiritual values. Frequently, fantasies involve integrating these needs, values, and defenses with the behavior of other people with whom we are in significant romantic, familial, social, or employment relationships.

Fantasies spring from outside stimuli and have varying effects on decisions and behavior. Some are based on memories of long-ago events. Constructive, positive fantasies are balanced and integrate charitable values. Negative, destructive daydreams emerge from repeatedly unsatisfied needs.

Fantasy types. Researchers have shown that the content of daydreams at each chronological age is consistent. At age two, and again throughout the teens, autonomy becomes an important need. Fantasies feature taking control, refusing to be led or dictated to, and following one's own plan of action. If these needs are successfully gratified at each age level, other more socially beneficial needs become prominent, such as the need for industry or intimacy. If the progress of normal need fulfillment is halted at any stage, it may produce aggressive, vengeful fantasies, retard maturity, and diminish self-esteem.

Children, for example, often use fantasy to satisfy the need for justice. A child deprived of self-esteem by physical and psychological abuse may indulge in rescue fantasies or dream about being strong or powerful enough to punish the abuser. If delivered from abuse, the child usually feels that justice has been served, and destructive fantasies cease. If the maltreatment continues, however, the want of justice may be subsumed by the desire for revenge. The child may expand the retaliation fantasy, imagining overcoming his or her helplessness by assuming power over others. This child may begin abusing animals, younger siblings, or schoolmates. In this way, the abused begins to become the abuser.

Fantasies are flexible; they evolve as the person processes and integrates new, objective information. Normal individuals usually reject negative fantasies for those more positive. Fantasies are also reality-oriented, incorporating an individual's actual capacities, limitations, and options. The daydreams of well-adjusted individuals incorporate empathy, sympathy, responsibility, and moral rightness.

When emotion wells up in an emotionally healthy person, he or she fantasizes about constructive options for achieving positive satisfaction for him- or herself and others.

The fantasy content of those whose emotional needs have become unhealthy often includes hostility, amorality, pornography, deceit, viciousness, and violence. The fantasies may also become obsessions, building in intensity until the individual is driven to fulfill them without consideration of real-life consequences.

The pattern of daydreaming in an abnormal individual can be erratic, unstable, and unpredictable, beginning, for example, with excessive love that later turns to excessive hostility. The mood of the fantasizer matches his or her fantasies, either buoyant or depressive. These fantasies do not help the individual cope with stress or real-life situations but rather lead the fantasizer into isolation and increasingly impulsive acts.

At this low ebb, the fantasizer cannot distinguish the real from the imagined or integrate objective outside facts into his or her daydreams. This tendency leads to imaginings of the past overriding present objective experience; in other words, although the fantasizer is not in a hostile situation, he or she continues to imagine violent self-defense or vengeance in the face of an imagined antagonistic environment.

Criminal fantasies. In the late 1970s, the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit probed the minds of incarcerated sexual offenders through in-depth, personal interviews. The goal was to help crime-scene investigators create a profile of the sexual predator from clues left behind. One of the researchers' most valuable findings was the importance of fantasy to the violent criminal.

Almost all of the violent offenders studied had intense fantasy lives that provided mental escape and drove their real-life behavior. Planning their crimes in detail formed a large part of these imaginings-for example, they mentally selected their weapons, bindings, and other tools to control their victims, and chose specific acts of torture to inflict on them. The more the offender dwelt on these fantasies, research revealed, the more intense the drive to act them out became.

During the FBI interview, for example, serial killer Edmund Emil Kemper III told agents that he daydreamed about luring female hitchhikers into his vehicle to sexually assault and murder them. Eventually, Kemper tested the waters by picking up several girls and releasing them unharmed. Emboldened and assured that he would have no problem obtaining victims, Kemper unleashed his fantasies of rape and murder, going on to kill six women before escalating to killing and raping his own mother and her friend.

The FBI agents determined that preliminary signs of his later behavior were exhibited in Kemper's play as a child and in his adult behavior. For instance, as a child, Kemper had tortured and killed neighborhood pets, including burying his own family cat alive.

Emotionally disturbed employees or students, therefore, may telegraph signs of violent fantasies to peers before some incident precipitates an act of violence. Supervisors and teachers should be trained to pick up these signs.

Leakage. The FBI studies and other research efforts have shown that the imaginer has a strong desire to keep his or her inner world from being exposed. However, it is human nature to communicate internal emotions, especially to friends and family. Although the imaginer may try to conceal his or her fantasies, indications will often escape as unintentional words or actions known as "leakage."

Verbal clues. Verbal leaks are direct statements usually made after some triggering event heightens the imaginer's emotional agitation beyond the limits of control. The individual may also regularly refer to violence and tell stories about violent situations, especially other incidents of workplace or school violence. He or she may make threats or cryptic statements about problems, such as "next week none of this will matter anymore."

Nonverbal clues. Often signs of destructive fantasies can be observed in body language. For instance, an angry person will often clench his or her fists in the presence of a disliked individual. Neck veins may protrude, the face may become flushed, jaw muscles will tighten, and breathing will become heavier and erratic. The individual may sigh, appear disgusted, glance furtively, stare or look away, exhibit signs of impatience, and roll his or her eyes. Facial expressions may have a cold, dispassionate, distanced, or pained appearance. The fantasizer may also adopt a cocky "tough guy" posture. Sexual fantasizers may sit with their legs apart, wear suggestively

tight clothing, or fix their gaze on the intimate areas of a coworker's body.

Possessions. Personal possessions also communicate the details of an abnormal fantasy life. Unnecessary symbols of authority such as handcuffs, badges, and weapons can betray fantasies of power and control. The individual will often become interested in guns and knives, especially those designed for killing people.

The imaginer may also surround him- or herself with books, magazines, and videotapes about killing, martial arts, the paramilitary, mercenary soldiering, and sexual sadism. He or she may dress wholly or in part in camouflage uniforms. In addition, these individuals often drive cars of the same make and model as police or military vehicles.

Music. Music has always been deeply associated with romantic, melancholic, and violent fantasies. An obsessive preference for any type of music featuring lyrics about revenge and battles against authority can be an indicator of potential external violence.

Drugs and alcohol. A troubled individual may resort to some sort of substance abuse. Drinking and drug use can either deaden the acute desire to turn a violent fantasy into reality or loosen inhibitions, facilitating dangerous behavior. It may also increase verbal leakage.

Recklessness. Another sign of abnormal fantasies is reckless behavior at work. This activity can include ignoring safety precautions or driving wildly in company vehicles and when arriving or leaving the employer's property. Recklessness may also be financial.

Suicide. The majority of vengeful murders in the workplace result in suicide. Therefore, leakage may reveal suicidal thoughts and self-destructive fantasies. The individual may cease making payments on his or her mortgage, credit cards, or car because he or she "won't be around when the creditors come calling." The individual may also begin giving away his or her personal possessions.

Harassment. Like the child who abuses his schoolmates to feel powerful, disturbed adults will often seek out targets for racial, gender, ethnic, or sexual harassment. They may also develop erotomania, which is the pursuit of a romantic liaison with someone who has made it clear that romance is not welcome. Frequently, erotomania results in the disturbed individual's stalking the victim.

Stressors. A stressor, or precipitating event that leads to a violent outbreak, is often the perceived echo of an event that once created painful emotions. It is exaggerated in importance by the individual, takes over his or her fantasies, and finally transforms the fantasy into destructive plans to terminate the perceived injustice and reestablish self-esteem.

Precipitating stressors may occur on the job, in school, or at home. They may include family conflicts or tragedies, the failure of a friendship or romantic relationship, financial difficulties, failing health, legal problems, or the birth of a child. The stressor may also have nothing to do with a person's own life. For example, a violent event could be triggered in copycat fashion by hearing a news report or reading a magazine article about a violent incident that is similar to the person's abnormal fantasy.

A stressor is not always a "final straw." A series of stressors may be necessary to cause a violent occurrence, or they may drive a series of smaller disruptive events or malicious mischief. In one case our company worked on, a worker began writing and distributing an underground newsletter revealing the peccadilloes of management and employees. Other examples of this type of behavior are puncturing the tires or scratching the paint of a perceived enemy's automobile, stealing or destroying a coworker's personal possessions, or leaving threatening notes or e-mail messages.

When anger is directed against an organization rather than at a specific individual, the malicious behavior will usually take the form of product and project tampering or sabotage. One well-known case of sabotage with catastrophic consequences was the December 1984 poison gas leak at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, which killed approximately 3,000 people. Investigations revealed that a disgruntled worker decided to ruin a batch of the company's chemicals by diluting them with water. He did not understand that, by doing so, he was creating a pervasive deadly gas.

Sabotage may include subtly changing a database or a written product to undermine the company's or a specific group's integrity. In another case our company consulted on, a

computer systems analyst with access to every employee's computer files argued with a coworker. He began to change the accuracy of that person's work just enough to create noticeable project problems that called the coworker's competency into question.

When a stressor occurs that leads to violence, it is often born from fantasies of possession, control, recognition, achievement, and intellectual prowess that lead to hostage-taking. Outcomes of these types of fantasies include kidnapping and extortion. When triggered by the appropriate stressor, fantasies of vengeance and control lead to assaults, rapes, and homicides. By obtaining power over other human beings via a deadly weapon, the person literally achieves the power of life and death.

Solutions. At work, managers, supervisors, security officers, and frontline employees can be trained to look for signs of violence and report them to a threat management team. This team can create a plan to neutralize the potential threat, either by therapeutically rehabilitating the employee or discharging that person if rehabilitation is deemed unlikely. In the latter case, however, the termination can easily become the precipitating stressor of violence. The termination process must be tailored to the profile of the volatile employee. (And, of course, the company must ensure that all policies regarding such firings are implemented in accordance with all applicable laws.)

In one of our firm's cases, an employee with exceptional computer skills often became embroiled in heated arguments with coworkers. His company chose to dismiss him with a grant to attend an anger management course and a business etiquette program. He successfully completed each course and went on to find successful employment elsewhere.

Therapy. Therapists who specialize in working with dangerous patients try to help such patients change their self-perceptions and, thereby, their internal fantasies. The goal is to reduce their tendency toward violent thoughts and actions. This process is neither fast nor easy, and a company committed to rehabilitating the employee must be prepared for a lengthy undertaking. If the company has a medical services unit, the organization's medical practitioner should be briefed on the case and should discuss it with the therapist.

At the heart of a therapeutic program should be the premise that humans can choose between what is morally and ethically right and wrong. The person must learn to control his or her thought processes, subverting dangerous fantasies of revenge. Positive and constructive fantasies must eventually replace the destructive thoughts of the individual in the hope that such thoughts will one day become routine.

Workplace or school violence almost never occurs without warning. By learning to spot the early clues to a dangerous fantasy life, persons in authority may be able to intervene in time to avoid a real-life nightmare.

Roger L. Depue, Ph.D., former special agent chief of the FBI Behavioral Science Unit, is the founder of the Academy Group, Inc., of Manassas, Virginia, a forensic behavioral science consulting firm. His wife, Joanne M. Depue, Ph.D., professor emeritus of the Pontifical Gregorian Institute in Rome, is a clinical psychologist at St. John's Pastoral Counseling Center, Warrenton, Virginia.

Reprinted from Security Management, June 1999.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Antrobus, J.S., Antrobus, Judith S., and Singer, J.L. "Experiments Accompanying Daydreaming, Visual Imagery, and Thought Suppression." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1964, 69, 244-252.

Antrobus, J.S., Greenberg, S. and Singer, J.L. "Studies in the Stream of Consciousness: Experimental Enhancement and Suppression of Spontaneous Cognitive Process." *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 1966, 23, 399-417.

Barth, F. Diane. *Daydreaming*. New York: Viking (Penguin Books), 1997.

Berkowitz, J. *The Roots of Aggression*. New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1989.

Bissi, Anna, S.L. *Multi-faceted Development*. Ph.D. Dissertation. Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1987.

Csiksentmihalyi, Mihaly. *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*. New York: Harper and Row, 1990.

Imoda, Franco, S.J. *Human Development*. Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 1998.

Klinger, Eric, Ph.D. "Dimensions of Thought and Imagery in Normal Waking States." *Journal of Altered States of Consciousness*, 1978-79, 4, 97-113.

Klinger, Eric, Ph.D. The Central Place of Imagery in Human Functioning. In E. Klinger (Ed.), *Imagery: Concepts, Results and Applications*. New York: Plenum, 1981, pp. 3-16.

Klinger, Eric, Ph.D. "The Power of Daydreams." *Psychology Today*. Oct., 1987: 21 (10), 36-39, 42, 44.

Klinger, Eric, Ph.D. Emotional Mediation of Motivational Influences on Cognitive Processes. In F. Halisch and J. van den Bercken (eds.), *International Perspectives on Achievement and Task Motivation*. Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger, 1988.

Klinger, Eric, Ph.D. *Daydreaming*. Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc., 1990.

Monahan, John. *Predicting Violent Behavior*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981.

Ressler, Robert K., Burgess, Ann W., Douglas, John E. *Sexual Homicide: Patterns and Motives*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books: D.C. Heath and Company, 1988, pp. 34, 42, 214.

Samenow, Stanton E. *Inside the Criminal Mind*. New York: Times Books, 1984, pp. 216, 220.

Singer, Jerome L. *The Control of Aggression and Violence: Cognitive and Physiological Factors*. New York: Academic Press, 1971. Chapter 2.

Singer, Jerome L. *The Inner World of Daydreaming*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. (Ed.)

Singer, Jerome L. "Daydreaming and the Stream of Thought." *American Scientist*. 1974, 2, 4, 417-425.

Singer, Jerome L. *The Child's World of Make-Believe*. New York: Academic Press, 1975.

Singer, Jerome L. "Navigating the Stream of Consciousness: Research on Daydreaming and Related Inner Experience." *American Psychologist*, 1975.

Cyberbullying and Information Exposure: User-Generated Content in Post-Secondary Education

Elizabeth Englander
Professor of Psychology & Director, Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center
Bridgewater State College

Abstract

The term "Cyberimmersion" refers to the central role that the Internet and electronic communications now play in the lives of individuals born after 1980 in the First World. Cyberimmersion has transformed everything about bullying and harassment between youth in the First World. It has also transformed the information landscape, although confusion about the scope and nature of this transformation is common. User-generated content has opened the door to a vast "spillage" of information, both damaging and promising. Younger users evidence a high comfort level with technology but many remain naïve in the areas of electronic security, privacy, and information exposure. This report details research findings from the Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center on the frequency and nature of online interactions between college students, some of which encompass bullying and harassing behaviors and others of which deal with information sharing and exposure.

Where's the Information?

Information was once subject to the limitations of paper reproduction and physical distribution, editing or content control, reader interest, or all three. Important sources of information were generally produced only by professionals. These restrictions served to confine the amount and type of information, to ensure that the most widely-disseminated information (e.g., through newspapers) met basic quality controls, and to limit the wide dissemination of spontaneous, emotional writing.

That was then. Today, the explosion of *user-generated content* – that is, content created and published online by any willing individual, with no qualification requirements, and subject to no editing or editorial control – has changed the social, political, and emotional landscape in which the First World exists. Two major elements of this change greatly affect colleges and universities and the students they serve. The first is that user-generated content has given birth to an enormous amount of destructive cyberbullying or cyberharassment; and the second is *information exposure*, a seemingly bizarre phenomenon whereby individuals freely and deliberately disseminate confidential or personally damaging information (including

incriminating facts) to the widest possible audience, apparently without concern for any consequences.

Cyberbullying

Bullying[3] *in K-12 Schools*. Much data exists to confirm the growth and consequences of traditional ("schoolyard") peer abuse (euphemistically referred to as "bullying"). The Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center at Bridgewater State College was founded in 2004 and at that time I focused on bullying prevention among children, without much regard to what was happening concurrently online. While always in existence, bullying behaviors have increased in frequency and in severity in the past few decades (Olweus, 1993). The 2005 Youth Risk Behavior Survey in Massachusetts found that 24 percent of Massachusetts teenagers reported being bullied at school in the year before the survey. One-fourth of Massachusetts schools in a December 2006 survey conducted by the Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center (MARC) characterized the bullying in their school as "serious" or "extremely serious" (Englander, 2007). The problem does not seem to be improving. In that same survey, 54 percent of Massachusetts schools indicated that bullying had become more of a problem "in the last few years" (Englander, 2007). After querying educators recently about how often they estimate that bullying "really" happens, most estimated the frequency at an event every few hours. Figure 1 displays those findings.



Figure 1. Query to Educators: How often does bullying *actually* occur, in your best estimation?

Cyberbullying in K-12 Education. Around the winter of 2005-2006, online bullying incidents in middle and high schools in Massachusetts (and nationwide) began to ring an increasingly insistent bell in MARC's field work in education. Our research began to

[3] Bullying refers to the physical and or psychological abuse, perpetuated by one powerful child upon another, with the intention to harm or dominate. Typically, bullying is repetitive, intentional, and involves an imbalance of power (Olweus, 1991).

focus increasingly on how bullying was migrating into the online world. We decided to begin studying freshman in College – ideal subjects, as they are only very recently removed from High School, where their online tribulations are presumably still fresh in their minds, yet most are 18 years of age and thus parental consent is not required.

Cyberbullying – the abuse of choice of the Cyberimmersion Generation – is the perfect bullying crime. It is very hurtful, yet (generally) does not kill its victims; it is extremely simple and easy; it does not require significant planning or thought; it similarly does not require self-confidence or social finesse; and the perpetrator is extremely unlikely to be caught or disciplined. The victim is always accessible (e.g., you can blog about someone online without their physical presence), and the generation gap ensures likewise that the oversight of adults will be sporadic or absent. Technological advances designed to prevent cyberbullying are often easily circumvented (e.g., school computer system filters) and adults are so often out of touch that they may be unaware of the frequency of cyberbullying or the types that exist – never mind being unaware of how to control or reduce it.

Risk Factors for Cyberbullying. Little research exists that can inform the study of cyberbullying risks. Some experts have postulated that risks for cyberbullying include less education about electronic communications, risks, and values; being less able to rely on parents for guidance about the Internet; and being less attentive to – or not receiving – Internet safety messages (Willard, 2006). Only 8 percent of schools have any education for children about Internet safety or bullying, even though experts agree that education in this area is the key to safety (Devaney, 2007). Anecdotal evidence suggests that being a victim of offline bullying may increase the probability of becoming an online cyberbully (Englander, 2007). Schools in Massachusetts have reported that many offline bullies operate online as well (Englander, 2007), suggesting that risk factors for cyberbullying may include the risk factors for traditional bullying.

At the time of this writing, cyberbullying occurs primarily through webpages, online social networking websites, and instant messaging via the Internet and cellphones. The 2007 MARC cyberbullying study found that despite the high numbers of online abuse victims, instant messaging and talking on cell phones were only slightly less popular as preferred communication strategies to speaking face-to-face. Thus the Immersion Generation sees digital communication as indispensable, regardless of its misuses by peers. And they are correct; it is fact no longer dispensable, and has not been so for quite a long time.

The rapid evolution of technology and the way it is used renders any specific type of cyberbullying definition (e.g., "sending abusive emails") obsolete by publication date. Indeed, it is perfectly possible and even likely that in the short months intervening between this writing and its publication, new technologies may well have spurred new types of cyberbullying.

A characteristic that makes cyberbullying particularly insidious is that derogatory statements or threats and humiliating pictures or videos of a person can instantaneously be sent to hundreds of viewers with the click of a button. This can exploit the natural developmental tendency of adolescents to feel constantly watched or "on stage" (often referred to as "imaginary audience"). Bad as it is to be cornered by a schoolyard bully, in an isolated corner of the schoolyard there isn't a vast audience to witness your humiliation. Thus the problems associated with schoolyard bullying may be magnified in cases of cyberbullying (Englander, 2006). Anecdotal cases support that possibility (e.g., the Ryan Halligan case (Halligan, 2003)), but the real research remains to be done.

We knew from a few national studies that cyberbullying had emerged as one result of the increasingly online social life in which modern teens and children engage. Teens reported having received threatening messages, having had private emails or messages forwarded without their consent; having had an embarrassing picture of themselves posted online without their consent; or having had rumors spread about them online (Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2007). A few frequency estimates suggest that cyberbullying may become – or may already be – the dominant form of bullying behavior among children. A recent telephone study of 886 U.S. Internet users age 12 to 17 (conducted October to November, 2006) found that one-third (32 percent) of all teenagers who use the Internet say they have been targeted for cyberbullying online (Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2007). MARC research in 2006 and again in 2007 found that of a sample of several hundred freshman, 40% reported having been "harassed, bullied, stalked, or threatened via instant messaging" (Englander, 2006). Twenty percent (in 2006) and 24% (in 2007) of students admitted to being a cyberbully themselves. These numbers were in the same ballpark as the 2006 poll of 1,000 children conducted by Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, which found cyberbullying frequencies of about 33 percent - similar to those found by Pew and MARC (Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2007). These numbers suggest that cyberbullying (with about 35-40 percent admitting victimization) may be more common than traditional bullying (with about 20-24 percent admitting victimization).

Cyberbullying Goes to College. Critically, however, these numbers all focus primarily on K-12 students. In the 2007 study, we decided to investigate whether or not online bullying (possibly unlike traditional bullying) would follow students to college. I did not anticipate that it would, and was surprised to find that 8% of the respondents reported being cyberbullied via instant messaging *while at college*. While the frequency of cyberbullying diminished significantly following high school, it did not cease entirely. Figure 2 shows the distribution of secondary and post-secondary online bullying victimization among our subjects.



Figure 2: Frequency of cyberbullying victimization

As with cyberbullying victimization, the proportion of college students who admitted to being cyberbullies is much lower relative to high school students – in this study, 3% of college students admitted to cyberbullying others *while in college*. Figure 3 compares the frequency of cyberbullying behaviors between high school and college.



Figure 3: Frequency of cyberbullying

Comparing Secondary and Post-Secondary Cyberbullying. It is notable that only 10 individuals admitted to being a cyberbully while in college; for that reason, any comparisons and results must be only regarded as suggestive (73 respondents admitted to being a cyberbully while in high school). In the analysis below, "high school cyberbullies" refers to *college students who reported being a cyberbully while they were in high school* and "college cyberbullies" refers to *college students who reported being a cyberbully while in college*. The first comparison, shown below in Figure 4, shows a different gender distribution between high school and college cyberbullies. High school cyberbullies were much more likely to be female, but college cyberbullies were slightly more likely to be male. Figure 5 shows that high school cyberbullies were, on the whole, younger than college cyberbullies.



Figure 4. Gender in secondary versus post-secondary cyberbullies.



Figure 5. Age of high school versus college cyberbullies.

When we asked respondents about programs their high school had offered to help prevent bullying and/or cyberbullying, some interesting findings emerged. About equal proportions of high school cyberbullies and college cyberbullies had had such programs in high school, but college cyberbullies were much more pessimistic about the likelihood that such programs would make an impact; they also saw adults as more likely to be making no attempt to stop bullying and cyberbullying. High school cyberbullies were more likely to see adults as ineffective but well-intentioned (see

Figures 6 and 7). Almost no cyberbullies thought adults were *doing a lot* to stop cyberbullying.



Figure 6. Would a program in your HS have helped reduce cyberbullying?



Figure 7. Did adults do enough to prevent cyberbullying in your school?

The data also clearly suggest that respondents tended to be victims of cyberbullying at the same developmental period during which they were victimizing others. 80% of high school cyberbullies were also victims of cyberbullying during high school, and 50% of the college cyberbullies reported being victims in college (see Figure 8).



Figure 8: Were you a victim of cyberbullying? By cyberbully status.

Interestingly, college cyberbullies might be less experienced on employing user-generated content about themselves on the internet. A much higher proportion of college cyberbullies, relative to high school cyberbullies, reported that they had never posted a profile of themselves on a social networking site[4](see Figure 9).



Figure 9. Have you ever posted a profile about yourself? By cyberbully status.

[4] On social networking sites, users create "profiles" – user-generated webpages upon which they post information about themselves and permit other users to post information and to blog (enter unedited text).

In the most recent MARC survey (Englander, 2007), most cyberbullying perpetrators attributed their online bullying to either anger (65 percent) or "a joke" (35 percent) with "revenge" and "no reason" being distant third choices. These justifications for cyberbullying did not seem to differ significantly between high school and college cyberbullies (see Figure 10).



Figure 10. Reasons for cyberbullying, by cyberbully status.

Summary of Cyberbullying in College versus High School. This exploratory survey did find differences between those who cyberbullied only in high school and those who cyberbullied while in college. College cyberbullies tended to be a year or two older than their peers and were more likely to be male (relative to high school cyberbullies). They were less experienced with user-generated content (at least the social networking type), and they were more pessimistic about whether or not adults try to help adolescents with this issue; in any case, they found any such attempts to help wanting. Being even a mere year or two older, college cyberbullies may have missed any of the more recently-initiated attempts by parents or educators to educate them about online life. Taken together, these findings suggest that college cyberbullying, particularly, may be the result of a lack of education and awareness[5].

Cyberimmersion and Information Exposure.

Apart from promoting an enormous surge in cyberbullying, the explosion of user-generated content has also changed the nature of information sharing and has introduced to a new level the phenomenon of information exposure. It is not clear that user-generated content which reveals confidential or incriminating information or confessions is limited to high school and college students. Recent media reports have cited cases of educated, professional individuals who reveal inappropriate

[5] We know that *all* cyberbullying and online problems are at least partly related to education and awareness; these findings, however, suggest that college cyberbullies may be *particularly* unaware of such issues.

information on their social networking profiles[6] – in other words, individuals one would expect to have the judgment to "know better." Despite such reports, it seems clear that inappropriate information exposure happens predominantly among college and high school students. Indeed, in our research, almost three-quarters of college-aged respondents felt that high students frequently put themselves at risk by posting too much information online (Figure 11).



Figure 11. Do high schoolers post too much information online?

One intriguing characteristic about Cyberimmersion is the naïveté exhibited by individuals who expose information about themselves yet are paradoxically very comfortable with, and sophisticated about, the *technical use* of information technology. This naïveté reveals itself in several ways.

- First, children who effortlessly surf through online games frequently believe that individuals could not pass themselves off as someone they are not – a characteristic frequently discussed when examining children's vulnerability to online predators[7].
- Second, individuals often exhibit a lack of understanding about the *limits* of some privacy mechanisms. For example, many users of Facebook set their profiles to "private," believing that this results in iron-clad security. They then

[6] *When Young Teachers Go Wild On The Web, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/27/AR2008042702213.html* (April 27, 2008)

[7] Having difficulty understanding that something may *appear* differently from its *substance* is a well-documented developmental limitation. I vividly recall a conversation between two of my sons, then 9 and 12, about whether or not an adult could pretend to be a child online. My 12-year-old saw clearly that such a ruse was entirely possible; my 9-year-old keep insisting that "adults and children don't talk the same" (i.e., if it appears to be a child, it must actually be a child).

blithely utilize applications within their profile that frequently expose all their information to the second-party software developers who develop these applications; or, they are certain that no one would ever reproduce their information in a less secure area (although that could happen very easily – imagine a quarrel with a friend who decides to take revenge by doing just that).

- Third, very few users (young or old) seem to realize the permanence of the internet. Having grown up with the concept of deletion, it is hard to imagine that absolutely anything and everything put online might be visible forever. Most users have never heard, for example, of archiving websites. This is a cruel concept for a child, who is bound to make mistakes and does not necessarily deserve to have these mistakes haunt him or her forever; but it is the reality of online life.
- Fourth, many individuals believe that openly visible content would not, or could not, be viewed by those in a position to judge them (e.g., employers). This includes content that the user makes absolutely no attempt to keep private or secure. I have seen countless examples of information exposed or poor judgment advertised to the world on the internet by users who seemed, inexplicably, to believe that it would never be seen. This could conceivably be part of a "mob effect," namely, that users could conceptualize the internet as so vast that their little input is unlikely to ever be seen; but the internet is in fact organized by users into smaller "communities," sites that are visited again and again by a smaller group of people, and this renders that information far less likely to go unnoticed.
- Fifth, even when they themselves have experienced an online attack, many adolescents and young adults seem to persist in the belief that what's online doesn't "count" and thus doesn't hurt. This inability to extrapolate from their own victimization experiences to understand someone else's perspective is developmentally typical in adolescence and not surprising.

Manifestations of Cyberimmersion and Information Exposure. Among college students, we've noticed a significant rise in two types of websites: gossip sites, and three dimension virtual worlds. These are quite different and distinct from one another and they both utilize user-generated content; both may result in information exposure.

Gossip sites. These websites are, in essence, online competitions where individuals strive against each other to produce the most tantalizing piece of gossip. Examples are *juicycampus.com* and *campusgossip.com*. Both are geared towards college students. Both sites are advertisement-funded and do not cost users anything. In an effort to elicit the best nuggets of gossip, sites do not even require users to register – a step that does, to some extent, increase accountability (although using false or non-identifying information and email addresses to register is simple to do). The sites "rate" gossip based on the number of people who click on (and presumably read) gossip. Users compete to get the highest scores without regard for the feelings and consequence of those whose presumably private difficulties are being repeated in the

gossip for the world to see. Gossip sites have created havoc on some campuses; at some universities, students (who typically support for free access) have actually asked campus IT to block these sites[8]. Anyone searching for information on these sites should note that JuicyCampus, at least, claims it is not indexed by Google.

Three dimension virtual worlds. Some have maintained that the future of the internet lies in virtual worlds, within which a user moves through information and entertainment portals that are similar to the websites found on the conventional internet we use today. The difference between the traditional internet and virtual worlds is through the emotional and audiovisual experience and in how information is located. It is difficult to describe a virtual world through text, as it is truly a unique experience. As an example, consider a situation where you were seeking information about purchasing a car. In the bricks-and-mortar world, you would go to a car dealer and look at the car – possibly test-drive it. Online, you might search or look for the URL for a car dealer or manufacturer and one you've found the URL, go to their webpage. In a virtual world, you would (using your computer) go the dealer's lot and look at (and possibly test-drive) a virtual version of the car you're interested in. Virtual worlds are more intuitively similar to the bricks-and-mortar world, in comparison to the internet we use widely today.

Virtual worlds are used for socializing as well as for information and marketing, which is where user-generated content and information exposure occur. People can build virtual homes, put up virtual billboards about themselves, and because there are few or no limits, disclose any or everything about themselves.

Conclusion

User-generated content on the World Wide Web (the internet) has changed the world. There is no doubt about this. It has changed how children grow up; how they learn and think; how they interact with their peers; and how they navigate their lives. It has impacted political decisions and outcomes in a profound way. It is unlikely that this genie will ever be able to be put back in the bottle. As technology becomes more sophisticated, politically-motivated limitations on internet access will likely become easier to circumvent. Currently we find ourselves in a unique situation: young people are technically savvy but naïve about online security. This possibly temporary situation exposes opportunities for both gathering information that is unwittingly exposed and for being targeted in a potentially devastating manner online.

The research presented here on college cyberbullies represents a small start in the field, but it underscores the need for education and awareness. Indeed, there is no plausible alternative to such preparation, as people will be living at least some of their lives online. Furthermore, understanding the dangers online (including those from their peers) can help targets of cyberbullying withstand attacks emotionally, and can help others avoid the kind of information exposure that places so many at risk. At the Massachusetts Aggression Reduction Center, our goal is to conduct the research

[8] *Backlash hits juicycampus.com, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23211511/* (May 30, 2008)

and fieldwork needed to bring up to date assistance to the people of Massachusetts. This includes work on violence, bullying, cyberbullying, and cyber behaviors that are potentially dangerous and harmful. With this data, we can become armed with the knowledge we need to teach children, parents, educators, and other professionals in the best methods of preventing harm.

References

Aftab, P. (2005). *WiredSafety*. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Wired Kids, Inc. Retrieved July 3, 2007, from *http://wiredsafety.org*

Bangeman, E. (2007) *Study: Fears Over Kid's Online Safety Overblow*. Retrieved August 9, 2007, from *http://arstechnica.com/news.ars*

Berends, M., Bodilly, S., and Kirby, S.N. (2002). *Facing the Challenges of Whole-School Reform: New American Schools after a Decade*. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation.

Brown, Jackson, and Cassidy (2006). Cyber-bullying: Developing policy to direct responses that are equitable and effective in addressing this special form of bullying. *Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy* 57, 8-11.

Cohn, A., and Canter, A. (2003). *Bullying: Facts for Schools and Parents*. Arlington, VA: National Association of School Psychologists. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from *http://www.naspcenter.org/resources*

Davis, S. (2004). *Schools where everyone belongs: Practical strategies for reducing bullying*. Wayne, ME: Research Press.

Devaney, L. (2007). *Education the key to better security*. Retrieved July 31, 2007, from *http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/showStory.cfm?ArticleID=7253*.

Englander, E.K. & Lawson, C. (In Press). Bullies, Eggers, and Bystanders: New Approaches to Preventing Peer Abuse among Children. In L.C. Terr and N.B. Webb (Eds.), *Play Therapy with Children in Crisis: Third Edition*. (pp. 37-56) New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Englander, E. (2005). When should you hesitate to mediate? *Models of Respecting Everyone 1*(1), 2-5.

Englander, E.K. (2006). Spare the bully and spoil the school. Presented at the National Trends in Violence Prevention Conference, Topsfield, Massachusetts: March 22, 2006.

Englander, E.K. (2007). Cyberbullying: The New Frontier. *Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Pediatric Rehabilitation Conference*. Franciscan Hospital for Children and Boston University School of Medicine, March 23, 2007. Burlington, MA.

Englander, E.K. (2001, September 30). Exposure to Violence can have significant impact on children. [Op-Ed]. Brockton Sunday Enterprise.

Halligan, J. (2003). *In Memory of Ryan Patrick Halligan*. Retrieved August 24, 2007 from *http://www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org*.

Kruger, J., Epley, N., Parker, J., and Ng, Z. (2005). Egocentrism Over E-Mail: Can We Communicate as Well as We Think? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89*(6), No. 6, 925–936.

LaHoud, S. (2007, March 18). Bridgewater State professor takes aim at bullying. Attleboro Sun Chronicle.

Mullin-Rindler, Nancy (2003) Findings from the Massachusetts Bullying Prevention Initiative. Unpublished manuscript.
Nansel, T.R., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R.S., Ruan, W.J., Simons-Morton, B., and Scheidt, P. (2001). Bullying behaviors among U.S. youth: Prevalence and association with psychosocial adjustment. *Journal of the American Medical Association 285*(16), 2094-2100.
National Education Association. (2003). National bullying awareness campaign. Retrieved July 24, 2007 from, *www.nea.org/schoolsafety/bullying.html*
National School Safety and Security Services (2005). School deaths, school shootings, and high-profile incidents of school violence. Retrieved July 24, 2007 from *http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/school_violence.html*
National Youth Violence Prevention Resource Center: (2002). Facts for Teens. Retrieved July 30, 2006 from *http://www.safeyouth.org*
Olweus, D. (1991). Bully/victim problems among school children: Some basic facts and effects of a school based intervention Program. In D. Pepler & K. Rubin (Eds.) *The development and treatment of childhood aggression*, pp.411-438. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Olweus, D. (1993). *Bullying at School: What We Know and What We Can Do*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
Pew Internet & American Life Project (2007). Cyberbullying and Online Teens. Retrieved July 31, 2007 from,
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/216/report_display.asp
Staub, E. (1999, January 1). Aggression and self-esteem. *APA Monitor Online 30*(1). Retrieved July 18, 2007 from *http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan99/point.html*
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2002). The Continuation of Education 2002, NCES 2002-025. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Vaillancourt, T. (2004). Toward a bully-free community: The case of Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. *Teaching and Learning 1*(3), 14-16.
Willard, N. E. 2006. Cyberbullying: What educators need to know to combat online cruelty. Education Week Online. Retrieved April 5, 2007 from
http://www.edweek.org